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
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PROBLEMS OF NONDIVISIONAL TRAINING IN THE ARMY GROUND FORCES

Study No. 14

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
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2. From the first, the history was designed primarily for the Army. Its object is to give an account of what was done from the point of view of the command preparing the history, including a candid, and factual account of difficulties, mistakes recognized as such, the means by which, in the opinion of those concerned, they might have been avoided, the measures used to overcome them, and the effectiveness of such measures. The history is not intended to be laudatory.

3. The history of the Army Ground Forces is composed of monographs on the subjects selected, and of two volumes in which an overall history is presented. A separate volume is devoted to the activities of each of the major subordinate commands.

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BY COMMAND OF GENERAL DEVERS:


J. L. FARR
Colonel, AGF
Acting Ground Adj General

1 Incl:
Historical Study

The Army Ground Forces

**PROBLEMS OF NONDIVISIONAL TRAINING
IN THE ARMY GROUND FORCES
Study No. 14**

**By
Major Bell I. Wiley**

**Historical Section • Army Ground Forces
1946**

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PREFATORY NOTE

This study was written by Major Bell I. Wiley while a member of the Historical Section, Headquarters Army Ground Forces. Major Wiley is presently Chairman of the Department of History, Louisiana State University.

This study is a presentation of the problems peculiar to the training of separate ground force units as distinguished from the problem of training divisions. It is written from the point of view of Headquarters Army Ground Forces.

Special mention is due the members of the General and Special Staff Sections of this headquarters who provided much of the material and collaborated in the preparation of the study.

INTRODUCTION

Nondivisional units activated and trained by the Army Ground Forces (AGF) were of two principal types: combat and service. Combat units consisted mainly of antiaircraft, cavalry, coast artillery, field artillery, infantry, tank and tank destroyer organizations. Service units included machine records, medical, military police, ordnance, and quartermaster organizations. Chemical, engineer, and signal units were in one or the other of these classes depending on the nature of their functions and associations. The ratio of combat to service units in Army Ground Forces varied from time to time, but during the first year of the AGF period the aggregate strength of the former was roughly twice that of the latter. Subsequently, there was an increase in the relative strength of the combat units in Army Ground Forces. Throughout 1944 and the early months of 1945 approximately three-fourths of nondivisional strength in Army Ground Forces was in combat units.¹

The enlisted strength (actual) of AGF nondivisional units in the United States on 30 June 1942 was about 300,000. Six months later the figure had passed the half-million mark, and on 30 June 1943, it was about 800,000, the highest point attained during the AGF period. On 31 December 1943 nondivisional enlisted strength (actual) had fallen to about 650,000; on 31 July 1944 the figure was 520,989; on 31 December 1944, 191,122; and on 31 March 1945, 31,397.²

In 1942 the strength of these "spare parts"³ with the Army Ground Forces was considerably less than that of divisions, but early in 1943 the gap began to close, and in 1944 the strength curve of divisions fell below that of nondivisional units. In the aggregate the strength of spare parts trained by Army Ground Forces exceeded that of divisions. The table of organization (T/O) strength of AGF-type nondivisional units active in the Troop Basis (in the United States and abroad) on 31 March 1945 was 1,468,941 officers and men, while that of divisions was only 1,194,398, a ratio of approximately 15 to 12.⁴

On 30 April 1942 there were approximately seven hundred nondivisional units scattered throughout the Army Ground Force domain.⁵ Those engaged in basic training were guided by mobilization training programs (MTP's), prepared during the GHQ period by chiefs of the appropriate arm or service. Those in advanced period, units followed weekly schedules drawn up by their own commanders in accordance with directives of a very general nature issued by higher headquarters.⁶

Higher supervision of training of spare parts organizations during the early AGF period was left almost wholly to armies, corps, commands,

and centers. This situation was attributable to three principal causes: (1) The AGF staff was too much absorbed in setting up headquarters organizations and procedures for its rapidly expanding strength to permit close attention to field activities; inspections had to be held to a minimum. (2) Divisions were given a higher priority than spare parts on the theory that the latter could be trained in less time and with less difficulty than the former. (3) Supervision of service units suffered from the fact that the initial AGF organization did not provide special staff sections, except for military police.⁷

The emphasis on large units was responsible in part for the failure to set up a systematic scheme for the activation of spare parts similar to the well-charted procedure adopted in early 1942 for the building of divisions. Officers for nondivisional units were sometimes designated and given special training prior to activation day, but there was no provision for systematic schooling of either commissioned or enlisted cadre.⁸ Personnel shortages and the mad scramble for units produced by a plan for a cross-channel invasion of Europe in the spring of 1943, then effective, would doubtless have vitiated any pre-drawn scheme for building nondivisional units. The mere existence of such a system, however, might have forestalled some of the confusion, and when the manpower crisis abated in late 1942 the system could have been invoked immediately. No chart for building nondivisional units was published until 18 March 1943. Its effects were not realizable until summer because initial steps in the creation of units had to be taken three months prior to activation day.⁹

The spare parts situation was complicated further in the early AGF period by failure of the War Department in the reorganization of 9 March 1942 to fix clearly as between Services of Supply (SOS) and Army Ground Forces the responsibility for training service units. In April, and again in May, the Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, requested clarification of this troublesome matter.¹⁰ On 30 May the War Department laid down the principle that in general "the using command will train a unit." In elaborating this policy these rules were set forth: (1) The Commanding General, Army Air Forces, would train all units serving with the Air Forces. (2) The Commanding General, Services of Supply, would train units organized to operate installations and activities controlled by him and those units organized in the United States solely for Services of Supply installations and activities in overseas garrisons, bases, and theaters. (3) Commanding generals of Defense Commands and independent commands would be responsible for the training of units assigned to them. (4) The Commanding General, Army Ground Forces, would be responsible for the training of all units not falling in the above categories. (5) By mutual agreement the commanding generals, Army Air Forces, Army Ground Forces, and Services of Supply might transfer to one another the responsibility for training certain units.¹¹

This declaration of policy was helpful as far as it went. But it left unsettled the responsibility for training of those types of units, such as quartermaster truck regiments and engineer general service regiments, which might be used in either the combat or communications zone. Both Services of Supply (later Army Service Forces) and Army Ground Forces claimed the right to train these borderline types and urged their cases intermittently on the War Department. Early in June 1942, G-3 of the War Department proposed to publish "a list of units peculiar to Services of Supply" to be activated and trained by Services of Supply only.¹² Army Ground Forces and Services of Supply, at War Department request, recommended units for inclusion in the proposed list and on 20 June a list was published.¹³ But the compromise which it represented was not satisfactory to either headquarters.

As eventually established after the shakedown period following reorganization of the War Department in March 1942, AGF responsibilities in connection with nondivisional units were essentially as follows: (1) Activation of units in categories and quantities necessary to meet requirements established by the War Department. Basic requirements were laid down in War Department Troop Bases, but modifications to meet changes in strategic plans and other exigencies were frequent, and sometimes great. Army Ground Forces had to adapt activation and training schedules to successive revisions of requirements. The problem of AGF was complicated by failure of the War Department to adjust the flow of inductees to the various changes in mobilization requirements. (2) Subject to the general supervision of the War Department, AGF had complete jurisdiction over the training of ground-type nondivisional units. During the early period of AGF, ground service units followed MTP's prepared by chiefs of the technical services, but this was for the sake of expediency and convenience; from the beginning preparation of training programs for ground units was an AGF prerogative. (3) AGF was responsible for training all personnel of the ground arms, but since the technical services had jurisdiction over the schooling of their respective officers and enlisted specialists, AGF had to look to ASF for officers of service branches and for the training of such enlisted technicians as could not be provided within the units.

The machinery provided in AGF for the discharge of nondivisional responsibilities was in brief as follows: The G-1 Section (through its Officer, Enlisted, and Assignments Divisions) set up policies for the procurement and assignment of personnel. Details of enlisted assignment were executed by the AG Section through the Classification and Replacement Division. G-3 exercised general supervision over activation and training, but administration of details was delegated to special staff sections and subordinate commands. Mobilization Division of G-3 determined activation schedules, designated "parent units," and prescribed activation procedures; this division also, in

coordination with other interested divisions of G-3 and appropriate special staff sections, drafted activation letters for guidance of the army or other subordinate commands charged with actual activation; if the activation required action of ground agencies only, the activation letter was issued by AGF; if it called for action by chiefs of technical service or other outside agencies, it was issued by the War Department.

Special staff sections, under the general supervision of G-3, prepared general training programs and directives for guidance of service units, and made occasional inspections to see that armies and other subordinate commands complied with them. The infantry, field artillery, and other branches in the Training Division of G-3 performed similar functions for nondivisional units of the arms. G-4 maintained liaison with War Department supply agencies to see that units were provided with equipment as specified in tables of equipment and other applicable regulations. G-4 also established policies for maintenance of equipment and, in coordination with G-3, prescribed and supervised training in maintenance and maintenance discipline.

Preparation of tests, except for unit tests for field artillery and certain other units of the arms was, as a rule, delegated to subordinate commands.

ESTABLISHMENT OF HEADQUARTERS AND HEADQUARTERS

DETACHMENTS, SPECIAL TROOPS

During the early months of AGF it became increasingly apparent that some method had to be devised for improving the supervision of nondivisional training. The seven hundred odd units scattered about the country were assigned to lower headquarters, principally to armies, but army staffs were not large enough to permit a close control over the numerous regiments, battalions, and companies dotting their far-flung commands. It was not unusual in 1942 for separate companies to go for months without being tested by representatives of higher echelons, and sometimes the intervals between visits of inspection were unduly long. Excerpts from the Inspector General's Report of 11 December 1942 throw light on this point:¹⁴

1. Camp Edwards, Mass., 663rd Engineer Company, activated prior to 31 May 1942. "No training tests ... have been made by higher headquarters."
2. Fort Meade, Maryland, 229th Signal Operations Company. "The unit commander stated that visits from higher headquarters

were made monthly but were of very little help in training. No training tests have been made by higher headquarters."

3. Ft. Devens, Mass., 206th Military Police Company. "No test of training has been made by higher headquarters."

Lack of intensive direction was particularly unfortunate during the early Army Ground Forces period because of the dearth at that time of satisfactory manuals, detailed training programs, and other literature for guidance of unit commanders.¹⁵

Army commanders attached many of the spare parts to corps, but corps were no more able to give effective supervision than were armies; besides corps headquarters were supposed to be lean, tactical organizations. The accumulating burden of spare parts threatened to pervert corps headquarters into bulky administrative organizations. In April 1942, Inspector General Virgil L. Peterson reported that Third Army had attached eighty-three separate units, aggregating 30,000 troops, to IV Corps for administration and training, and that IV Corps had added twenty-five more officers to its headquarters than were authorized by current tables of organization.¹⁶ Later in the spring the III Corps was swamped with 60,000 of 100,000 nondivisional troops which Army Ground Forces had received from the First Army and the Eastern Defense Command.¹⁷

In some instances separate units were attached to divisions, and even to regiments; and in other cases army commanders, without the formality of attachment, simply directed division commanders to give an eye occasionally to spare parts stationed in the vicinity of their headquarters. These arrangements were not satisfactory.¹⁸ Division commanders, harassed as they were in 1942 by gargantuan difficulties, and knowing well that their reputations rested on the showing made by organic troops in tests, inspections, and maneuvers, gave scant heed to the stepchildren dumped on their laps by higher headquarters.

One other consideration made remedial action desirable. The stationing of small separate units at the same posts as divisions, as was frequently the case, placed commanding officers of the former at a decided disadvantage with reference to equipment and services provided by post authorities. When post commanders received requests contemporaneously for the building of training aids from the captain of a signal company (who frequently was young and inexperienced in military procedure) and the major general of a division, there was a strong tendency for him to favor the stars over the bars. In view of the scarcity of equipment in 1942, the result was frequently a failure to fill requisitions of low-ranking commanders.¹⁹

Shortly after Inspector General Peterson's report of the unhappy situation in April 1942 with respect to nondivisional troops in the IV Corps and Third Army, General McNair, in conformity with a suggestion of General Marshall,²⁰ directed his staff to work out a solution for the spare parts problem. Various schemes were considered but they all involved the setting up of small supervisory headquarters under corps or army jurisdiction at all stations where a considerable number of nondivisional troops were located.²¹

On 21 May 1942, Army Ground Forces sent out letters to the commanders of Second Army, Third Army, II Corps, and VII Corps, authorizing the creation by each of an experimental headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, at some undesignated station. A two-fold objective was stated: first to intensify supervision of nondivisional units; and second to curb the increasing tendency of corps toward administrative functions. Two types of headquarters were authorized: Type A, consisting of 5 officers and 16 enlisted men, for stations where nondivisional troops aggregated 2,000 - 5,000; and Type B, consisting of 8 officers and 31 enlisted men, where spare parts personnel exceeded 5,000.²² Commanding officers of both type headquarters were to have the rank of colonel; army and corps commanders concerned were directed to report to Army Ground Forces "as soon as the measures taken have been tested sufficiently to warrant conclusions."²³

The first response to this directive came from General Lear on 29 May.²⁴ The Second Army commander, on the basis of his own difficulties with spare parts,²⁵ had already instituted remedial procedures at two stations along the same lines now advocated by Army Ground Forces. On 29 December 1941 he had designated ten miscellaneous units at Ft. Knox, Ky., as Special Troops, Second Army, and placed them under a small provisional headquarters commanded by Lt. Col. (later Col.) Ben Stafford.²⁶ He had made a similar disposition of separate units stationed at Ft. Custer, Mich., with Colonel George Byers in command.²⁷ These two experiments had convinced him that the supervisory detachment scheme was practicable. His recommendation to Army Ground Forces on 29 May, therefore, was the immediate establishment of Type A Headquarters at eight Second Army stations, including Ft. Custer and Ft. Knox.²⁸

In June and July ten headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, were activated by Second Army and one each by Third Army, II Corps, and VII Corps. In ensuing months others were added so as to produce a total on 31 December 1942 of twenty-nine, distributed as follows:

Second Army	--	13
Third Army	--	8
Corps	--	7
Armored Comd	--	1

The number of these headquarters reached a peak of 49 in July 1943, with 15 assigned to Second Army, 16 to Third Army, 13 to Corps, 1 to Armored Command, and 4 to the California-Arizona Maneuver Area (C-AMA).²⁹ The action initiated in July 1943 for placing all nondivisional combat units under corps, and the decline of the strength of service units under ACF control resulting from overseas movement, made possible the inactivation of several headquarters special troops in late 1943 and early 1944.

The functions of special troops headquarters varied somewhat in the different commands, but directives of Army Ground Forces and subordinate headquarters placed primary stress on the supervision of training. General Lear was particularly insistent that priority should be given to such training. The personal letter that he wrote to each officer placed in command of a detachment affords a good illustration of the nature of the supervisory duties. "I desire that you assure compliance with provisions of training directives and memoranda from headquarters," wrote the Second Army commander, "and that you will coordinate the use of training aids, facilities, and equipment, in the best interest of all units. I desire that you supervise preparation of training schedules and that you follow through full compliance with them."³⁰

"It is particularly important," General Lear continued, "that you assure yourself by inspections and conferences with unit commanders, and in instructions to them, that proper attention is being given to matters affecting the discipline, morale, soldierly bearing, and appearance of personnel. I desire also that you supervise carefully the conditions of barracks, messes, and equipment." Lest there be some question as to the extent of the commanding officer's authority, General Lear added: "You are my personal representative at Fort _____ and orders issued by you to members of your command have my full sanction."³¹

Commanding officers of headquarters detachments also had a number of administrative responsibilities. They exercised special court-martial jurisdiction and took final action on requests for leaves, furloughs, and on transfers of enlisted men between units under their command. The following administrative matters passed through their offices: (1) Recommendations for promotions, reclassification, and reassignment of officers, (2) board proceedings for selection of enlisted personnel to attend Officer Candidate School (OCS), (3) assignment of officers to units ordered overseas, (4) investigation and charges for trial by general court-martial, and (5) discharge of enlisted men prior to expiration of term of service. They were also responsible for preparation of units for movement overseas or to other stations. In many cases the headquarters staffs devoted considerable attention to instruction in administrative procedure of the inexperienced officers of units under their supervision.³²

Detachment commanders were assisted in their supervisory duties by visits and communications of the staffs of the higher headquarters to which they were immediately responsible. But even so, the responsibilities of most were onerous. The shortage of personnel caused a tendency on the part of higher commands to hold staff personnel of special troops detachments to reduced levels.³³ Type A Headquarters often had to supervise units aggregating considerably more than five thousand troops, and some Type B Headquarters were required to supervise from 50 to 60 units with a strength of from 10,000 to 15,000 men. Sometimes units under jurisdiction of a special troops headquarters were located at widely separated stations. In September 1942 General Hyssong of Army Ground Forces reported that the 1st Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Special Troops, Second Army, was supervising some units located at its home station, Ft. Bragg, others at Camp Davis, 125 miles east of Ft. Bragg, and still others at Camp Sutton, 100 miles west of Ft. Bragg. A Third Army headquarters and headquarters detachment was charged with the supervision of units scattered at four Louisiana stations.³⁴

The creation of many additional headquarters and headquarters detachments in late 1942 and early 1943 reduced the necessity of assigning excessive numbers of spare parts personnel to any one commander. The practice of extending supervision to several stations was curtailed by provision late in 1942 for setting up reduced versions of Type A Headquarters at posts where nondivisional personnel fell short of two thousand, but where as many as four units were located.³⁵

Appraisal of headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, reveals several defects and shortcomings. The policy that was sometimes followed of choosing as commanders men who, because of advanced age or other handicaps, were not deemed suitable for more active duty had unhappy consequences. As one Army Ground Force staff member bluntly put it: "You didn't often get effective command from a worn-out colonel who had failed to make good in some other capacity."³⁶ A second deficiency derived from the failure to staff the special troops headquarters in such a way as to provide competent supervision for all the specialties represented in units under their jurisdiction.³⁷ This point can best be illustrated by a hypothetical but not improbable case. The five officers comprising a Type A headquarters were an infantry colonel, a lieutenant colonel of engineers, an infantry major, and a captain each of ordnance and the quartermaster corps. This staff might be charged with supervision of a miscellany made up of artillery, chemical, engineer, ordnance, quartermaster and signal units. The "dough-boy" colonel and major would have little knowledge of the intricacies of artillery practice, and less of the technical functions involved in the training of the service organizations. The ordnance units might be of three distinct types and yet be required to look for advice and instruction to a young captain who recently had been a "straw boss" in

an automobile factory. The signal and chemical units, being unrepresented on the headquarters staff, would have to fend for themselves, with particularly unfortunate consequences if, as was likely, the commanders of both units were young and inexperienced.

The question naturally arises: why was the policy not invoked of including on the headquarters staff an officer of each arm or service represented among attached units? Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, was aware of the desirability of such an arrangement, but two factors prevented its effectuation prior to 1944. First was General McNair's consistent opposition to concentration of more than two or three units of any one type at any one station.³⁸ Second was the scarcity of officers. In 1942 there was a deficiency of officers of all arms and services. The officer situation improved generally in 1943, but serious shortages in some categories, particularly in medical and engineer units, persisted even in 1944.³⁹

Second Army attempted to cope with the deficiency of specialist supervision in detachment staffs by making temporary details, in cases of the most urgent need, from its own headquarters personnel. For instance, if railhead and gas supply companies were assigned to a special troops detachment having no quartermaster officer on its staff, the army quartermaster sent one of his own assistants to the headquarters in question to assist, for a period not exceeding two months, the special troops commander in supervision of the quartermaster units.⁴⁰ But Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, disapproved this procedure as an undesirable use of army staff.⁴¹

A third shortcoming of the headquarters special troops was a tendency on the part of some to slight training for administration and to substitute paper for personal contact in the supervision of attached units. In September 1942, Colonel (later Major General) Hyssong reported that some detachment commanders were preparing directives that should have been issued by army and that others, instead of simply initialing papers addressed by higher headquarters to units under their supervision, as they were supposed to do, were transmitting them by formal indorsement.⁴² Of one special troops headquarters, General McNair, to whom overuse of the mimeograph was ever a bete noire, wrote to General Lear: "The Headquarters is definitely administering when it should be training. Those headquarters should not even be in the administrative channel. The commander should be out with the units every day, all day. His administration consists solely of spot checks in the units themselves ... the commanding officer is getting entirely too much mail."⁴³

Despite their handicaps and shortcomings, the headquarters and headquarters detachments special troops filled a vital need and served a useful function in the supervision of nondivisional training. They af-

forded a home and an articulate parent for hundreds of small units. The colonels who commanded the headquarters were men of broad experience and acquaintance. When they asked post commanders for services and equipment, the requests were more apt to bring results than when made by low ranking and inexperienced leaders of small separate units. The colonels also knew better how to deal with the staffs of army and corps.⁴⁴


The headquarters, special troops, also facilitated administration on the part of higher commands. Army staffs found it much easier and more effective to deal with and hold responsible one officer at a given station than to attempt direct supervision of many separate and uncoordinated parts. At various times General McNair, The Inspector General's Office, and army commanders noted with approval the salutary effect which these headquarters had produced in the training of small units.⁴⁵ At the end of his career as Second Army commander, General Lear, whose knowledge of the work of the special troops headquarters was particularly intimate, wrote to General Marshall: "The organization of these detachments for training and administration is sound." He stated further that it would be desirable to place brigadier generals in command of some of the larger headquarters,⁴⁶ a suggestion which was adopted in 1944.⁴⁷

REORGANIZATION AND ADJUSTMENT, 1943

During the latter part of 1942 and the early months of 1943 several steps were taken to improve nondivisional training. Outstanding among these was clarification by the War Department of the responsibility for training of service units. The principle laid down in the spring of 1942 that the using command would train a unit had produced confusion and controversy as to those types of units which might ultimately be used in either combat or Zone of Interior capacities. This situation, and the conviction that service organizations were not being adequately prepared for the discharge of their missions, caused the War Department in November to direct a fact-finding survey by The Inspector General with reference to the training of service units. The Inspector General visited eleven stations where considerable numbers of various type service organizations under Army Ground Forces control were located. He found many instances of personnel and equipment shortages; he also cited some cases of inadequate supervision. But evidences that both standards and methods were "steadily improving" and apprehension as to the disruption and expense that might result from a large-scale redistribution of units among the principal commands, caused him to recommend that no major changes be made in existing training policies.⁴⁸

Studying the problem, with The Inspector General's report in hand, G-3 of the War Department considered the possibility of grouping all

BUILDING A NONDIVISIONAL UNIT (Type Immaterial)



This chart will apply to a company, battalion, regiment, or units equivalent thereto.

Activating authority is the designated Army, separate Corps, or equivalent commander charged with the organization of the new unit

Remainder of officer complement for evacuation hospitals will arrive at station of activation when directed by this headquarters.

service units at unit training centers under SOS control for basic and technical training, and then transferring those destined for combat support to Army Ground Forces for instructions in tactical functions. But this proposal was ruled out on grounds of the cost and confusion that it would entail, and because of the obvious improvement made by Army Ground Forces in methods and plans for building and training of service organizations.⁴⁹

On 30 December 1942, the War Department announced that no fundamental change would be made in existing arrangements for the training of service units. At the same time the confusion which had prevailed as to responsibility for training "borderline" organizations was reduced by specific apportionment of units to each of the two commands.⁵⁰ The definite knowledge thus afforded made it possible for both commands better to plan schedules of activation and programs of training.

Establishment of Flexible Battalions and Groups

A second factor contributing to improvement of nondivisional training was the flexible attachment plan of organization adopted in 1942 for combat units and extended in 1943 to service type units.⁵¹ This scheme provided for the grouping of companies under administratively self-sufficient battalion headquarters, of battalions under groups, and of groups under brigades. The new type headquarters was designed primarily to facilitate tactical operations, but it also served a useful function in the supervision of training.

From the training standpoint the group headquarters was of greatest moment; it was particularly beneficial to service units. Generally speaking, the regiment, which the group replaced in all but infantry organizations, had provided satisfactory supervision for units of the arms; but in many cases small units of the services had not been formed into regiments because service troops were not frequently required in blocks as large as a regiment; or if organized as regiments they often were scattered at various stations apart from the parent headquarters, with no supervision immediately at hand save in the form of occasional visits by officers of the headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops.⁵² The group plan provided for the bringing together of varying numbers and types (of the same branch) of these "orphans" under an officer of sufficient rank and experience to give effective supervision. Concerning the practical value of the group as an intermediate agency the AGF Medical officer in January 1944 stated:⁵³

Because of the scarcity of medical officers many of the lieutenant colonels who command battalions are men in their early thirties. They do not have enough age and experience to exercise control over the training of units attached to battalion headquarters. Commanding officers of the group headquarters, on the other hand, are full colonels, old and experienced enough to carry considerable authority.

Not only was the group organization better adapted to supervision of training than the regimental set-up which it replaced in the tactical scheme, but it was also more economical of overhead personnel, in that it could accommodate a greater number of battalions. One advantage of the flexibility afforded by units being attached as in the group rather than organic as in the regiment was that a single headquarters could train several instalments of battalions. Then, when expediency or convenience might be better served by the change, units could be shifted from one headquarters to another while in process of training.

The group was designed as a predominantly tactical organization; General McNair wanted the group staff in training to concern itself only incidentally with paper work and to spend its time in the field supervising attached units. He insisted that the bulk of administration should be left to the battalion and to army, both of which were provided with administrative personnel.⁵⁴

In December 1942, group headquarters numbered only 27; on 31 March 1943, the figure had increased to 121, with distribution as follows:⁵⁵

Armored	10
Tank Destroyer	14
Antiaircraft	41
Field Artillery	45
Air Base Security	3
Combat Engineer	8

The heyday of the group came in the summer and fall of 1943, following extension of the plan of flexible attachment to service units. On 31 December 1943, group headquarters under the Army Ground Forces aggregated 170 with this distribution:⁵⁶

Armored	13
Tank Destroyer	20
Antiaircraft	43
Field Artillery	43
Engineers (C)	25
Medical	12
Ordnance (Base)	2
Quartermaster	12

Chemical, military police, and signal units were not formed in groups, because ground operations did not require a massing of these organizations.⁵⁷

The flexible attachment of groups to brigades was limited in practice to combat units, principally to antiaircraft organizations.⁵⁸

In medical, ordnance, and quartermaster organizations separate companies were attached to battalions in the same manner that battalions were attached to groups. In the combatant arms and in chemical, engineer, military police, and signal units, companies remained organic in battalions.⁵⁹

Agitation for Training Centers

While the practice of flexible grouping was in process of extension, the question of concentrating service units of the same branch for training came up for discussion at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces. It was generally admitted that concentration of like units had proved desirable and practicable in the cases of antiaircraft, armored, and tank destroyer organizations. Cognizance was taken of the fact that Army Service Forces had adopted the training center idea on a large scale. Second Army had assembled a considerable number of Signal units at Camp Crowder, and Third Army had grouped certain medical organizations at Ft. Sam Houston.⁶⁰ The feeling was rather strong in some elements of Army Ground Forces, particularly in army headquarters, that the principle of concentration was sound, and that training conditions required its extension to all the services.⁶¹

The question was brought to the attention of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, in September 1942 by a request of Third Army to adjust station assignments in such a way as to effect a widespread concentration of units by branch for basic and technical training. In response, Army Ground Forces, while admitting the desirability of grouping some types of units, declined to authorize general application of the practice.⁶² When Third Army asked permission in November to transfer some engineer units from Camp Maxey to Camp Swift on the ground that the latter afforded better training facilities for the type units concerned, the request was disapproved.⁶³ But this action did not represent the unanimous opinion of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces; both the Engineer Officer and G-4 favored approval of the request.⁶⁴

The issue of concentration was raised again on 31 December 1942 when Second Army sought authority to transfer 13 chemical units to Camps Rucker and McCain with a view to facilitating their training.⁶⁵ After a canvass of the staff sections on the general subject of concentration of units for training, the Second Army request was disapproved. In the round robin which preceded this action, G-1, the Engineer, and the Signal officer registered approval of the practice of grouping service organizations for basic and unit training.⁶⁶

Advocates of concentration supported their position with these arguments: (1) It gave new units the opportunity to profit from the counsel and example of old units of the same type. (2) It made possible the

pooling of equipment and instructional personnel and thus mitigated the greatest obstacles to training. (3) The economy achieved by pooling made possible the release of equipment to alerted units. (4) Branch grouping facilitated and improved supervision by higher headquarters; army headquarters staff could visit quartermaster units concentrated at two or three stations much more frequently and with far less expenditure of time and travel, than the same number of units dispersed over the army's entire area of jurisdiction; moreover, the headquarters, special troops, at the two or three centers could be staffed completely with expert quartermaster personnel, thus providing the vitally needed specialist supervision.⁶⁷

The principal argument of those who opposed large-scale concentration of service units was that such a practice created an unnatural situation. The raison d'être of Army Ground Force service units, they said, was the support of combat organizations. These units should grow up from the very beginning, therefore, in as close association as possible with fighting elements which they were designed to service. At the very earliest opportunity, the argument continued, ordnance companies should begin to service weapons of infantry and artillery units near them, quartermaster companies should likewise begin to perform subsistence and sanitary functions for combat troops, chemical units should provide smoke screens for them, and medical organizations should have doughboys on whom to practice first aid and evacuation.⁶⁸ Another objection to concentration was that it might deprive unit commanders of the responsibility for training the troops which later they were to lead in battle.⁶⁹

Proponents of concentration countered this argument with the statement that they advocated grouping only during the first stages of training, that during this period service units were not far enough advanced "to support anything," and that normal relations with combat organizations could be established during combined training, after graduation from the primary courses offered by the centers. G-1, Army Ground Forces, made the point that concentration had been approved for antiaircraft, armored, and tank destroyer elements, and that "if the idea is sound for these three, it is certainly sound for nondivisional units."⁷⁰

It was General McNair who finally ended the discussion. He took the position that large-scale concentration could be justified only in instances where training was so highly specialized that technical considerations outweighed the factor of normal association (which he thought to be the case with reference to antiaircraft, armored, tank destroyer, and certain types of service units), or where there was an extreme shortage of training equipment.⁷¹

The ultimate of concentration for service units that General McNair positively favored was the arrangement known as the "sponsor" or "buddy" system.⁷² In its original and most widely applied version, this scheme consisted of the stationing of a new unit near an older one of the same type, so that the latter might share with the former its equipment, its instructional staff, and its experience. A modification provided for grouping of three units as "buddies," the first in an early stage of training, the second in an intermediate stage, and the third in an advanced stage.

The "buddy" system was used first by the ordnance section. But during 1942 it was invoked on a large scale for quartermaster, signal, and engineer units.⁷³

Systematization of Activation Procedure

Of the various steps taken in late 1942 and early 1943 for the improvement of nondivisional training, one of the most significant was the adoption of a systematized procedure for the building of small separate units. Even before establishment of the Army Ground Forces a scheme had been devised for divisions, by which key officers were designated two or three months prior to activation day, sent to special preactivation courses at appropriate schools and, along with enlisted cadre-men chosen and trained ahead of time by parent units, channelled into camp for further training before arrival of fillers.⁷⁴ But as previously noted, because of higher priority of large units and other considerations, a similar system was not set up for nondivisional units. Hence key personnel of these units received no preactivation schooling. It was normal for nuclei to be hastily selected from miscellaneous sources, such as unit overstrength and replacement training centers, and assembled at camp at the time of activation without prior training in cadre duties. It was not uncommon for cadre and some of the fillers to arrive simultaneously on activation day.

The War Department suggested in August 1942 that a plan comparable to that for divisions be developed in spare parts.⁷⁵ Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, responded that such a system would be futile unless the War Department adhered more rigidly to the troop basis in the future than it had in the past. The haphazard procedure currently prevailing, Army Ground Forces pointed out, was attributable to shortage of personnel, which in turn was due to activation of units far in excess of the number stipulated in the 1942 troop basis.⁷⁶ G-3, Army Ground Forces, remarked pointedly: "The Special Staff agree that the only thing that has gone sour has been lack of personnel. No system will work without men."⁷⁷

But G-4, Army Ground Forces, instituted action to accomplish the War Department suggestion. On 20 November 1942, he submitted a plan for the activation of nondivisional units to other staff sections for comment.⁷⁸ G-1 objected strongly to the provision which required the furnishing of cadres by parent units. He urged instead the forming of cadres from the army's "floating population" of school and replacement personnel. "All that is needed is a designation of a place of assembly," he said, "where they can be sorted out according to their capabilities." One of his principal objections to the parent unit idea was the disruption which it entailed. "It would be much less of a strain to select a battalion cadre from an entire army," he concluded, "than from a single battalion."⁷⁹ G-1's objections were overruled. The prevailing opinion was that expressed by Plans: "Personnel trained as individuals in schools and replacement centers only, would have no conception of the complete unit which they are trying to build."⁸⁰

The most extensive comment on the G-4 plan came from G-3. The burden of the G-3 criticism was: (1) The G-4 scheme did not provide for anything not already considered normal procedure except the sending of key officers to service school prior to activation. (2) No plan would work unless definite knowledge of units to be activated could be obtained 90 days ahead of time - which was not likely, unless officers were available in advance and unless service schools had the facilities for training them. (3) Since the 1943 Troop Basis assigned the majority of nondivisional service units to Army Service Forces for activation and initial training, the G-4 study "would appear to be principally advisory in nature." The conclusion of G-3 was: "The present system of activation of nondivisional combat units is believed to be satisfactory and no change is recommended."⁸¹

In forwarding the G-3 comment to the Chief of Staff, the Plans Section noted that the current easing of the personnel situation promised to reduce deterrents to orderly activation. The Plans Section recommended, therefore, therefore, that the G-4 scheme be adopted and given a fair trial.⁸²

When the entire discussion was laid before General McNair in late December 1942, he wrote: "I feel definitely that G-4's proposals are excellent, and I hope that they can be put into effect. Even though substantially this procedure has been followed in the past, it is helpful to regularize the matter, and especially to obtain War Department approval."⁸³

During the early weeks of 1943 the G-4 scheme was subjected to further polishing and revision, but the plan published on 18 March 1943

did not differ materially from that originally brought forward four months before. The procedure which it prescribed for the activation of nondivisional units was along the same lines as that drawn up for divisions at the beginning of 1942.⁸⁴

This procedure provided that preliminary steps should be initiated ninety days prior to the activation of a unit. Officers and cadre were to be designated two months before "D" day and given special instruction for their forthcoming duties. Key officers were to attend a thirty-day course at the school of the appropriate arm or service. Commissioned personnel and enlisted cadre were to reach camp prior to activation day according to a schedule shown in the accompanying chart. Fillers and allotted overstrength were to arrive on "D" day. A minimum of 20 percent of the equipment was to be on hand at the time of activation.⁸⁵

The plan for building nondivisional units was followed rather closely during the first few months of its existence. But the dwindling of the manpower supply in the latter part of 1943 made rigid application an impossibility. Activations reverted to a regrettable extent to the old catch-as-catch-can basis which prevailed in 1942.⁸⁶

REVISIONS OF TRAINING PROGRAMS, 1943

The final weeks of 1942 and the early months of 1943 saw important changes in the training program of nondivisional organizations. The Army Ground Force Training Directive effective 1 November 1942 contained general instructions for each principal category of spare parts. The sections devoted to artillery indicated what training programs were to be followed, what tests were to be taken, and what subjects were to be stressed. Appropriate directives along the same lines were laid down in the paragraphs covering tank destroyer and cavalry units. Instructions for engineer, medical, ordnance, quartermaster, signal, and chemical units varied somewhat in character, but in most cases they designated the MTP's to be followed, the subjects to be emphasized, and the objectives to be sought.⁸⁷

The issuance of the new training directive gave impetus to a movement already under way to revise MTP's and unit training programs (UTP's). MTP's for service units were in most cases obsolete, lacking in detail, and insufficiently adapted to the needs of units destined to function in close association with combat organizations.⁸⁸ Deficiencies observed in combined training and in the theaters in the latter part of 1942 focused attention sharply on the fact that no UTP's had ever been prepared for guidance of service units.⁸⁹

Early in 1943 special staff sections were directed to revise MTP's covering the individual training period and to prepare UTP's, showing subjects to be covered, references to be used, and hours to be devoted to each subject.⁹⁰

The overhauling of MTP's proceeded more rapidly than the drawing up of UTP's. By the autumn of 1943, MTP revisions had been completed for all the services except the Medical Corps.⁹¹

A UTP for Signal units was published on 12 May 1943, but its usefulness was impaired by failure to provide subject schedules. In August 1943, programs for the unit training of engineer and quartermaster organizations were published, and in September a comprehensive UTP was issued by the Ground Ordnance Section. Early in 1944 a UTP was prepared for guidance of motorized chemical battalions. The Medical Section, in January 1944, drafted a directive outlining in general terms a unit training schedule for ground medical organizations.⁹²

These modifications of the training schedules of service organizations were paralleled by similar changes in programs of the combat arms. In January 1943 a thoroughgoing revision of both the basic and unit phases of the Field Artillery training program was completed. The new program was outstanding for the detail in which it broke down subjects scheduled for the unit training period.⁹³ In July 1943, the Antiaircraft Command, using the Field Artillery schedule as a model, worked out a new training program for units under its jurisdiction.⁹⁴ All organizations adjusted their programs in 1943 to accommodate provisions in Army Ground Force directives calling for greater stress on field exercises, combat firing, and physical and mental conditioning for battle.

The most important purpose served by the new MTP's and UTP's in both service and combat categories was a closer adaptation of training to requirements of modern combat as revealed by battle experience. Revised schedules provided greater emphasis and more specific coverage of such battle-proved subjects as night fighting, patrolling, security, reconnaissance, dispersion, concealment, camouflage, mines, booby traps, first aid, antitank protection, discipline, and physical hardening.⁹⁵

The Unit Training Programs filled a vital and long-standing need for detailed and specific guidance of small-unit commanders, many of whom were lacking in military background and experience.

CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND EQUIPMENT, 1943

Revisions of training programs were accompanied by changes in the organization and equipment of nondivisional units. During the period

following Pearl Harbor these units, like divisions, had shown a decided propensity toward fatness in transportation and personnel. In the fall of 1942, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, acting on War Department order, began a review of tables of organization for the purpose of reducing the size and equipment of both service and combat units.⁹⁶

The goal set for the reduction was a cut of 15 percent in personnel and 20 percent in vehicles.⁹⁷ These figures did not prove possible of attainment in all cases, but few were the units that were not subjected to severe pruning by the Reduction Board, an ad hoc agency set up at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.⁹⁸

Changes resulting from the Reduction Board's recommendations were many and varied, but they consisted in the main of the following: (1) reduction of chauffeurs, orderlies, cook's helpers, and communications personnel; (2) requiring one individual to serve in two capacities, for instance, chauffeurs being utilized for assistance in company kitchens; (3) elimination of "luxury" items of equipment; (4) cutting down or deletion of such articles from allotments to unit headquarters as chairs, tables, field safes, typewriters, and tents; (5) provision of combination sets of tools or equipment so that the same set might be used by more than one group or for more than one purpose; (6) elimination of organic service and support elements from tables of organization of small units, and charging of their function to similar elements of higher echelons; (7) merging of units performing related functions into one standard type; (8) substitution of trailers for trucks in all possible instances; and (9) replacement of heavy by light vehicles where practicable.⁹⁹

Critics of the Reduction Board claimed that the economies which it invoked were more apparent than real, and that in some cases the results would be opposite to those desired. The accomplishment of a given mission, they argued, required an irreducible minimum of manpower. If the force employed consisted of reduced units, the number of units must be increased. This meant an increase of overhead, and therefore was a waste rather than a saving of personnel. As one special staff head expressed it: "If you have a house to cover, you don't gain anything by cutting down on the size of the shingle. If you choose small shingles, you have to use more of them, and that means buying more nails and keeping the carpenter longer on the job."¹⁰⁰ This observation may be misleading, but reports from theaters in 1943 and 1944 indicated a widespread opposition on the part of unit commanders to revision in tables of organization and tables of equipment. Protests against the cuts in communications personnel were particularly frequent, the gist of the complaints being that a streamlined unit, say a division, required the same communications service as a large one. The same amount of wire had to be laid and the same number of messages sent; yet in revising

tables of organization, communications units had been subjected to about the same cut as the organizations which they served.¹⁰¹

STATUS OF NONDIVISIONAL TRAINING AT THE END OF 1943

The summer and fall of 1943 witnessed a continued effort to improve the quality of nondivisional training. An important item in the ameliorative program was the adoption of new and improved tests for field artillery battalions, tank destroyer battalions, and tank gunnery crews.¹⁰² Checking of combat intelligence training in all units was facilitated by comprehensive tests prepared in the G-2 Section of Headquarters, AGF.¹⁰³

During 1943 the demands of theater commanders for nondivisional units, particularly for service units, continued to be so great that many were dispatched overseas without benefit of combined training. Others were deprived of this training by the failure of army, corps, and other subordinate commanders to arrange combined arms exercises in such a way as to accommodate the maximum number of nondivisional units. On 20 January 1944, Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, sent a letter to subordinate commands urging them to provide a minimum of three weeks' field training for all nondivisional units. Participation in maneuvers was advocated as the most desirable form of field training, but if circumstances made this impracticable, units were to function with divisions in advanced tactical exercises known as the "D" series or, as a last resort, to operate under field conditions by themselves.¹⁰⁴ The dwindling number of divisions yet to be trained and the reduction of the scope of combined training which came with the closing of C-AMA, made the prospects for participation of supporting units in realistic field exercises in 1944 unpromising in the extreme.

But, despite existing difficulties and the unhappy prospect of things to come, nondivisional units were in a far better situation at the end of 1943 than they had ever been before. During the twenty months that had elapsed since inception of Army Ground Forces, activation procedure had been systematized, training programs had been recast to conform to the actualities of combat, supervision had been intensified by creation of intermediate headquarters, command had been streamlined by the setting up of flexible groups and battalions, checking of training proficiency had been improved by the modernization of tests and testing techniques, and increased productiveness of American factories had reduced to a rare phenomenon the spectacle of spare-parts soldiers using sticks for guns, rocks for grenades, and jeeps for tanks. The personnel situation left much to be desired but the impoverished conditions of the early Army Ground Force period seemed definitely a thing of the past.

CHANGES IN ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING, 1944 - 1945

Functions of the Group and the Brigade

Group and brigade headquarters as conceived in the Army Ground Forces by the general reorganization of 21 July 1943 were primarily tactical organizations, but like the corps, these organizations, particularly the group, in actual practice manifested a chronic tendency toward administration. This tendency sprang mainly from unwillingness of higher commanders to bypass the brigade and the group in dealing with battalions.¹⁰⁵

When the Antiaircraft Command in early 1944 asked for enlargement of the group headquarters to meet administrative demands, General McNair personally wrote a directive "to educate higher commanders and group commanders" in the appropriate functions of the group headquarters. The Army Ground Force commander admitted the responsibility of the group for the administrative efficiency of attached units, but this, he stated, was to be accomplished by instruction and correction of faults. "The group commander and his staff should devote their time and energy to the troops," he added, "and should be freed to the utmost from routine administrative duties."¹⁰⁶

General McNair's blast may have brought amelioration for a time, but as the months passed, groups, and to a lesser extent brigades, found themselves burdened with an increasing load of administrative and supply functions. Willy-nilly, group commanders seemed unable to avoid entanglement in the mass of paper produced by such activities as the processing of replacements and the distribution of supplies sent down from higher headquarters.¹⁰⁷ In theaters of operations a similar tendency to force group commanders into administrative channels was observed.¹⁰⁸

In August 1944, the War Department, noting that "recent reports from observers in the Zone of Interior and the theaters indicate that ... brigade and group headquarters are required to perform administrative functions," directed the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces to restudy T/O&E's and other pertinent publications with a view to providing adequate administrative and supply personnel.¹⁰⁹

The AGF reply to the War Department expressed nonconcurrence in the need of additional personnel for administrative functions in groups and brigades, but stated that if enlargement of these headquarters was a War Department decision, administrative staff should be added as

follows:

1. S-1 Section
 - 1 Captain, Adjutant and S-1
 - 1 Master Sergeant (Sergeant-Major)
 - 1 Clerk-typist, T/4
 - 1 Stenographer, T/3
2. S-4 Section
 - 1 Captain, Assistant S-4
 - 1 Clerk, record, T/4
 - 1 Clerk-typist, T/4

It was stated further that a total of 906 captains and 2,305 enlisted men would be required for enlarging brigade and group headquarters under AGF control.¹¹⁰

The War Department did not consider favorably the AGF nonconcurrence (in the proposal to enlarge group and brigade headquarters for administrative functions) but directed immediate revision of T/O's to provide the additional staff as outlined in the AGF memorandum.¹¹¹

In the final months of 1944 and the early months of 1945, new T/O's were published for all brigades and groups under AGF control. In most cases the revision provided for the addition of an administrative and supply section consisting of an Adjutant S-1, S-4, Assistant S-4, and from five to eight enlisted men to the brigade and group headquarters.¹¹²

This modification did not contemplate making the group (or brigade) administrative by any means to the same extent as a regiment. The group S-4 for instance was "to plan for, process papers, and supervise (but not physically handle) ... supplies, maintenance of equipment, salvage, ... evacuation of personnel, and traffic control." The duties of the S-1 were likewise mainly of a planning supervisory character.¹¹³ In short, the group remained, in the AGF view at least, predominantly a tactical organization with administration restricted largely to supervisory and processing functions of a general nature; the bulk of administration remained with the battalion.

The concept of the group as a predominantly tactical organization, made up of self-sustaining and easily removable parts, was not as firmly held by the War Department as by the Army Ground Forces. This was attributable in part, it seems, to differing reactions of the two headquarters to overseas opposition to the group, particularly to the artillery group. An observer in the Southwest Pacific Theater stated in February 1945:¹¹⁴

Group Headquarters exercises no administrative control, but from administrative control stems uniformity in training. The term "flexibility" as applied to the separate battalion organization can frequently be translated "confusion." The indications are that the desirability of a return to the corps field artillery brigade and to regimental organization within the corps brigade is under consideration.

Earlier in 1944 Brig. Gen. (later Maj. Gen.) J. A. Crane, Chief of Artillery, Allied Forces Headquarters, stated:¹¹⁵

Separate battalions and separate group headquarters are a nuisance. They work under a decided handicap and constitute an uncoordinated mass of administrative chaff in an otherwise well-organized system ... There is no need whatsoever to break up organic corps artillery into separate battalions and separate headquarters like headless bodies and bodyless heads.

General Crane was also critical of the effect on morale and discipline of substituting the group for the regiment:¹¹⁶

A great letdown is beginning to manifest itself in matters of an administrative nature, sanitation, personal appearance, discipline, etc. It seems to be due to a lack of any feeling of loyalty to the group commander. He comes around to inspect. He finds something wrong. The troops say, "He don't know what we have been through, anyhow we will probably only be with him a week longer so we should worry ..."

General McNair apparently thought that much of the criticism of the group was attributable to the fact of its newness, and that as commanders became accustomed to it aversion would subside. In reply to General Crane's comments he observed: "Flexibility is the big object of the present organization. Admittedly the loss of the old regimental traditions is regrettable, but I feel not a dominant consideration." But General McNair went on to state that he would not oppose recommendations for change based on war experience. His attitude in the summer of 1944 when he left the Army Ground Forces was one of wait and see.¹¹⁷ This view apparently was carried over to his successors; and on V-E Day the opinion still prevailed at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces; that evidence from overseas was not such as to warrant any considerable modification of the original concept of the group.¹¹⁸

As early as August 1944, sentiment in the War Department, reacting more positively to adverse reports from the theaters on discipline and morale in the group, had come to favor a change in its organization and function. After conferences with representatives of the Army Ground

Forces and the Army Service Forces, the War Department in November 1944 published a circular stating that "normally three or four battalions ... will be assigned to a group, and that additional battalions might be attached as required. Furthermore, the group was redefined as "an administrative and tactical unit."¹¹⁹

Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, interpreting the provision for assignment of units to groups as optional, and deeming attachment preferable to assignment for both the training and shipment of the group and its elements, elected to continue the existing scheme of flexible organization.¹²⁰

When the functions of group were defined in July 1943, the attachment of groups to headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, was forbidden. This prohibition sprang from the fact that at that time no group headquarters for service units had been activated in the Army Ground Forces, and planners were thinking solely in terms of combat units, which were to be assigned exclusively to corps.¹²¹ Extension of the group organization to service units, which normally were assigned to army, made it only common sense to provide a tie-up between the group and army's subagency, the headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops. This arrangement was authorized in July 1944.¹²² In March 1945, the Army Ground Forces gave subordinate commanders authority in exceptional cases where more effective training supervision was indicated, to attach combat-type group headquarters to headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops.¹²³

Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments, Special Troops

As the strength in nondivisional units declined in 1944 and the early months of 1945, inactivation of headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, proceeded apace. The number and distribution of these supervisory organizations by quarters was as follows:¹²⁴

	31 Mar 44	30 Jun 44	30 Sep 44	31 Dec 44	31 Mar 45
Army	27	25	15	14	10
Corps	13	9	4		
C-AMA	3				
ACF			1	1	1
Total	43	34	20	15	11

The decline in the number of these headquarters was paralleled by an increase in both their size and responsibilities. In the latter part of 1943 Second Army required headquarters and headquarters detachments,

special troops, to assume the task of Preparation for Overseas Movement (POM) of nondivisional units assigned to corps. Early in 1944 the Army Ground Forces approved this step, and in the months following the plan was applied to other AGF commands.¹²⁵ In one instance, at least, a headquarters and headquarters detachment was called on to act as the representative of army in supervising the POM of a division.¹²⁶

The great increase in the rate of overseas movements for the European invasion multiplied the duties which the headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, had to perform in connection with the final processing of their own units. Because group headquarters usually were shipped apart from their battalions, and frequently in advance of them, it became necessary to place the principal burden of preparing battalions for shipment on the special troops headquarters rather than on the group.¹²⁷

The various measures instituted in 1944 for a more effective utilization of manpower and the large turnover of personnel common from the beginning of the year placed an unprecedented volume of personnel administration on armies and other major commands. In February 1944 an AGF staff officer stated:¹²⁸

Within divisions where a regularly assigned classification officer has been provided, operation of the personnel classification system has for the most part been efficient ... On the other hand, the nondivisional units have not kept pace in this regard. Army classification officers do not have the time, facilities or personnel to handle all of the separate units in addition to the corps and divisions for which they are responsible. The lack of "on the ground" personnel to direct, supervise, and administer the classification system within nondivisional units has resulted in limiting the ability of personnel sections of such units to comply with either the intent or the letter of the various regulations and directives aimed at proper utilization of the personnel assigned. Over 400,000 men with the Army Ground Forces are without direct classification supervision. Approximately two-thirds of this number are in organizations attached to special troops headquarters.

To meet this situation a classification officer was added to each headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, in March 1944.¹²⁹

In part to meet the increasing volume and complexity of responsibilities, and in part to provide greater flexibility with reference to nondivisional strength at the various posts, the Army Ground Forces in July 1944, on recommendation of Second Army, authorized two new types of headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops. Under the

prior system there had been a Type A Headquarters of 7 officers and 20 enlisted men for stations having a nondivisional strength of 2,000 - 5,000 men and a Type B Headquarters of 9 officers and 32 enlisted men for those housing over 5,000 men. The set-up instituted in July 1944 authorized a Type C Headquarters of 11 officers and 35 enlisted men at posts where nondivisional strength was 2,500 - 3,000 and Type D Headquarters of 16 officers, 1 warrant officer, and 49 enlisted men where it exceeded 7,500. All A and B Headquarters not scheduled for inactivation in the near future were to be converted to C and D Types. In calculating the strength of units to determine the appropriate type headquarters for a given post, one-third of the corps troops were counted because of the responsibilities which the headquarters and headquarters detachments bore for POM of these units. The most striking difference between the composition of Type D Headquarters and the B Type that it superseded was the relatively greater strength in the former of administrative and supply personnel.¹³⁰

In the fall of 1944 the size and the functions of the headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, were again increased. This change derived mainly from the prospective movement overseas of all the corps headquarters. When the III Corps departed in August 1944, a miscellany of nondivisional units was left on the West Coast without benefit of near supervision. To fill in the gap the Army Ground Forces set up at Ft. Ord a "super" headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, called it 1st Headquarters and Headquarters Detachment Special Troops, AGF, gave it general courts-martial jurisdiction, and placed some 42 units having a strength of over 10,000 men under its supervision for administration, supply, and training. The new headquarters, consisting of 28 officers (commanded by a brigadier general), 4 warrant officers, and 90 enlisted men, was charged with "all the functions and duties, normally discharged by an army or separate corps commander."¹³¹ Members of the AGF Staff sometimes referred to this organization jokingly as the "bob-tailed" corps.¹³²

The success of the experimental headquarters at Ft. Ord naturally suggested filling in the gap left by removal of other corps with a similar organization. In October 1944, the seven principal headquarters and headquarters detachments remaining in the Army Ground Forces were designated as "S" (for special) type, and authorized a strength of 30 officers, 5 warrant officers, and 88 enlisted men. To permit adaptation of the headquarters and headquarters detachments to variations in local needs, army commanders at their discretion were authorized to depart from the branch allocation of officers set forth in the published table of distribution. For example, the published table of distribution provided for 2 ordnance officers and 1 signal officer, but if a given headquarters had no ordnance units attached and had many signal units, the army commander could delete the ordnance officers and add 2 signal offi-

cers. All of the "S" type headquarters were assigned to army, but their functions were comparable to those prescribed in August for the headquarters at Ft. Ord.¹³³ One AGF staff officer said of the new organizations: "Special troops headquarters act as a branch army headquarters in dealing with all army units,"¹³⁴ and another said that these headquarters were recognized "as administrative as well as training agencies of the armies."¹³⁵

In the "S" type for the first time specific provision was made for inclusion in headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, of officers of the various services. This provision removed a principal source of criticism levelled at these organizations from the time of their inception; namely, their inability to furnish expert supervision for technical training.

'As the headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, declined in number and were reorganized into new types, they were able to shed their less capable officers. At the same time they received a larger admixture of combat experienced personnel from the ever-increasing flow of returnees pouring into the United States. At V-E Day the headquarters and headquarters detachments, while far from perfect, were considerably better adapted to their supervisory functions, from the standpoint both of organization and leadership, than they were during their pioneer days of 1942. On the whole their contribution to the training of the ground army was a valuable one.¹³⁶

Readjustment and Conversion¹³⁷

The period 1944-1945 witnessed important changes in the pattern of nondivisional strength to meet shifting requirements of overseas operations. Elements figuring most prominently in these adjustments were heavy field artillery, combat engineer, antiaircraft, tank destroyer, and quartermaster truck units.

Experience in the Mediterranean Theater, particularly at Cassino, helped to establish the soundness of a position long advocated by Headquarters, Army Ground Forces: namely, that heavy field artillery had a much more extensive role in modern warfare than was indicated by troop basis planning.¹³⁸ Throughout 1944 there was a marked trend upward in activations of 155-mm gun, 8-inch gun and howitzer, and 240-mm howitzer battalions. The number of heavy artillery battalions active in the troop basis jumped from 61 on 31 December 1943 to 116 on 30 June 1944 and 137 on 31 December 1944.¹³⁹

Similarly, theater experience gave force to the repeated insistence of the Ground Engineer officer that the proportion of combat types of engineer units as stipulated in the troop basis was grossly inadequate.¹⁴⁰

Revisions of mobilisation planning in late 1943 and 1944 provided for an increase in both engineer combat and heavy ponton battalions. On 31 December 1943 active battalions of these two types numbered 166; on 30 June 1944, there were 212; and six months later, 240.¹⁴¹ Of the 211 engineer combat battalions in existence on V-E Day, 82 were activated in 1944.¹⁴²

The trend toward heavier types of equipment and the increasing stress on conservation and maintenance in 1944-1945 resulted in a sharp rise in activations of ordnance heavy maintenance and evacuation units. Figures on these types of units were as follows:¹⁴³

Type Unit	Number active 31 Dec 43	Number active 30 Jun 44	Number active 31 Dec 44
Auto Maint Med	150	169	168
Hvy Auto Maint	91	136	139
Hvy Maint Field Army	41	59	58
Evacuation	26	51	53

The increase in quartermaster truck companies was no less marked. On 31 December 1943 the number of active companies (at home and abroad) was 611, on 30 June 1944, 814, and on 31 December 1944, 904.¹⁴⁴

In antiaircraft units, the trend was sharply downward, thus bearing out a point repeatedly urged by the Army Ground Forces in 1943, that the superiority of Allied Air Forces would reduce the requirement of anti-aircraft units to a figure much lower than that set forth in the troop basis. Antiaircraft units (active in the troop basis) which on 31 December 1943 numbered 557 fell to 479 on 30 June 1944, 347 on 31 December 1944, and 331 on 31 March 1945.¹⁴⁵ All in all, 258 antiaircraft units were inactivated or disbanded by Army Ground Forces between 1 January 1944 and V-E Day.¹⁴⁶

Theater experience proved that the Army Ground Forces had greatly overestimated requirements in one category: namely, tank destroyers. Between 1 January 1944 and V-E Day 26 tank destroyer battalions were inactivated by Army Ground Forces.¹⁴⁷

A large portion of the personnel made available by inactivation and disbandment of antiaircraft, coast artillery, tank destroyer, and other types of surplus units was utilized as fillers and replacements in infantry, field artillery, combat engineer, chemical, signal construction, and other types of units for which there was an increased requirement. Conversion training was given in appropriate replacement training centers or in the new unit.

In many instances units which became surplus in the troop basis were converted en bloc (less field grade officers, who usually were withdrawn prior to conversion) to units for which there was a current requirement. Coast artillery gun battalions were converted into heavy field artillery battalions; antiaircraft barrage balloon battalions into signal construction battalions; antiaircraft weapons and/or gun battalions into field artillery rocket battalions; chemical mortar battalions into engineer combat battalions; chemical decontamination companies into amphibian tractor and field artillery and tank battalions; cavalry squadrons into signal information and monitoring companies; and chemical decontamination companies into quartermaster gas supply companies.¹⁴⁸

Conversion of units was not accomplished without considerable difficulty. Personnel had to be given special training for their new duties in schools and within the organization. Urgency of overseas needs was sometimes so great as to allow insufficient time for thorough conversion training. Officers and noncommissioned officers were often slow in adapting themselves to their new duties, and in consequence lost effectiveness as leaders. A feeling of being kicked about had a deleterious effect on morale of both officers and men.¹⁴⁹

There was a considerable amount of adjustment in the form of reorganization of units from one type to another in the same arm or service. Typical examples were: reorganization of ordnance light maintenance companies to evacuation companies; ordnance medium automotive maintenance companies to heavy automotive maintenance companies; armored signal battalions (not required after discontinuance of armored corps) to signal operations battalions; engineer topographic units to maintenance and depot units; and engineer camouflage battalions to combat battalions.¹⁵⁰

These reorganizations were at best apt to be wasteful because of failure to make full use of specialist training. Speaking particularly of ordnance reorganization an AGF staff officer stated:¹⁵¹

Usually it would have been better to inactivate the units being reorganized, transfer the personnel to other units of the same type that were understrength or use them as loss replacements and start from scratch with personnel from reception centers. When we made evacuation companies out of maintenance companies we required many men trained to do one type of work to learn to do another type. Their abilities should have been utilized in other maintenance companies, and evacuation companies formed from reception center personnel.

Sometimes sudden changes in requirements made reorganization seem wasteful in the extreme. On one occasion, for example, reorganization

of some engineer heavy ponton battalions into light equipment companies was followed in two months by an order to activate more heavy ponton battalions.¹⁵²

Conversion of antiaircraft and tank destroyer units undoubtedly would have been more extensive had not their utility been increased by wider employment in secondary roles. In the theaters tank destroyers were used effectively as artillery in indirect fire missions, and for direct fire in support of ground troops, very much after the fashion of self-propelled infantry cannon.¹⁵³ Antiaircraft gun battalions employed their weapons to good purpose against ground targets, particularly against pill boxes and other enemy strong points; in the Pacific they turned their high velocity guns against openings of caves and dugouts to seal the Japs in their fastnesses.¹⁵⁴ In 1944, training programs were revised to provide for additional training of antiaircraft and tank destroyer units in their secondary missions.¹⁵⁵

Another significant adjustment was the employment of separate infantry regiments for conversion of certain categories of personnel to infantry, initiated in April 1944 when demand for infantry replacements became urgent. Their enlisted strength having been put in the replacement stream, nine regiments were refilled with men from antiaircraft, tank destroyer, and other types of surplus units, and launched on a program for intensive training of infantry riflemen. The first four weeks were devoted to individual training, including firing of the rifle for qualification, transition firing, familiarisation firing of other infantry weapons, bayonet, and grenades. Then came two weeks of tactical training of the individual soldier, followed by as much progressive unit training as time permitted. Special attention was devoted to the development of infantry noncommissioned officers.¹⁵⁶

The separate infantry regiments became essentially miniature infantry advanced replacement training centers. They made extensive use of the committee system of instruction common in replacement training installations.¹⁵⁷ Like the centers they suffered greatly from repeated replacement of experienced infantry officers with novices from officer candidate schools and personnel from other branches lacking in infantry experience.¹⁵⁸ On the whole the product of the infantry regiment was not as good as that of the infantry advanced replacement training center. Supervision and coordination seem to have been considerably better in the latter than in the former.¹⁵⁹

But as an expedient for the quick conversion of a miscellaneous surplusage to doughboys, the infantry regiments performed a valuable service. One of these regiments, the 140th, between April and December 1944, trained three increments of replacements. During this period 7,547 enlisted men, more than enough to provide infantry privates for

an entire infantry division, were "graduated" from the regiment. Of these 3,881 went to replacement depots, 2,368 to infantry divisions, and 46 to officer candidate school. In addition the regiment sent 153 officers overseas as replacements.¹⁶⁰

Several new types of nondivisional units came into existence in 1944-45, mainly in response to needs revealed by theater experience. Two experimental rocket battalions were activated at Ft. Sill mainly as a result of effective use of rockets by the Russians and the Germans in Europe and by the U. S. Navy in the Pacific.¹⁶¹ Two new types of signal units were brought into existence in response to the increased fluidity of modern warfare as demonstrated in Africa and Europe. The signal information and monitoring company was created for the purpose of getting information from the front line to the supreme tactical commander in a few minutes (instead of a few hours, as formerly) with a maximum of security. The signal radio relay company likewise was developed to speed the flow of information back from the front lines. This unit, using radio instead of wire, established and maintained relay stations at intervals along communications circuits and took measures necessary to prevent jamming.¹⁶²

Several types of new units were in process of creation at V-E Day. These included a surgical hospital to replace the field hospital set up near the division for treatment of nontransportable casualties; an engineer ponton bridge company, rigid boat, to handle the new M-4 bridge; a standard ordnance medium maintenance company to replace three types of medium maintenance companies then in operation; and a standard heavy maintenance company to supplant three types of companies in the heavy maintenance category. The ordnance evacuation company, which had been performing two distinct functions, was replaced by two units, a collecting company and a transporter company.¹⁶³

Testing and Training Programs

Changes in MTP's and UTP's in 1944 and 1945 were of a minor nature only, consisting mainly in bringing references up to date and adapting time allotments to the accelerated program of training. When V-E Day came, only the Quartermaster Section had within the past fifteen months completely revised applicable MTP's and UTP's, and modifications were mainly of a routine character. The Ordnance, Signal, and Engineer Sections were in the process of bringing their training programs up to date, and the Medical Section was engaged in adapting Army Service Forces MTP's to AGF use. In view of the small number of units being activated in the spring of 1945, revision of MTP's was at that time deemed of secondary importance to preparation of redeployment training programs.¹⁶⁴

Of considerably greater significance than these changes was the modification of the testing program. Early in 1944 for the first time tests, based on those prescribed for field artillery units, were published for antiaircraft automatic weapons, gun, and searchlight battalions. These tests, prepared by the Antiaircraft Command in close collaboration with Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and given by the Antiaircraft Command testing teams did much to improve the quality of antiaircraft training.¹⁶⁵ In August 1944, the Army Ground Forces published tests for checking the proficiency of antiaircraft gun battalions as reinforcing field artillery.¹⁶⁶ Later a similar test was completed for measuring the indirect fire proficiency of tank and tank destroyer battalions.¹⁶⁷

In March 1944 firing tests for infantry battalions and cavalry squadrons were made more realistic, and in April Tank Destroyer Combat Firing and Tactical Proficiency Tests were revised to standardize firing proficiency for all types of weapons and generally to stiffen requirements for a passing score. In the summer and autumn of 1944 there were minor revisions of Infantry Platoon Combat Firing Tests, Antiaircraft Gun, Weapons, and Searchlight Battalion Tests, Field Artillery Tests, and Cavalry Reconnaissance Squadron Field and Platoon Combat Firing Tests.¹⁶⁸

POM visits of the Inspector General in the early months of 1944 revealed many instances of service unit personnel being unable to perform their assigned duties in a satisfactory manner. This was found to be especially true of technical specialists. To remedy this situation, General McNair directed chiefs of the special staff sections to prepare appropriate tests for the checking of individuals and units in their technical specialties.¹⁶⁹

Before the end of 1944 Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Tests for the testing of individuals in their specialist functions had been prepared for all the services in the Army Ground Forces. In some cases MOS Tests disseminated by the Army Ground Forces were adaptations of tests already in use in subordinate commands; in other instances they were modifications of tests prepared by chiefs of the services.¹⁷⁰

MOS Tests usually consisted of two principal parts: (1) questions covering the character of the duties required of the individual; and (2) practical application of specialist techniques. For example, the test for MOS 017 - Baker, prepared by the AGF Quartermaster Section, contained these questions:

1. What is meant by "fermentation period"?
2. What factors promote or accelerate the growth of yeast in baking?
3. Differentiate between field and garrison bread.

The second and practical portion of the test required the baker (1) to prepare formula, weigh ingredients for garrison sheet bread, and mix dough with gasoline mixer for one over charge of 60 pounds of baked product; (2) to cut, roll, and pan a portion of mixed dough; (3) to operate the Model 1937 fire unit, obtaining the desired over temperature and load.¹⁷¹

The Quartermaster and Medical Sections supplemented the MOS Tests with exercises designed to check the qualifications of units to perform their primary missions. For example, the unit test for a quartermaster gasoline supply company required the company to move under tactical conditions from an assembly point to a bivouac area, set up and operate a bulk reduction point and a distributing point, and operate truck convoys between these points. Similarly, the test for a medical collecting company required this unit to collect and transport casualties under tactical conditions.¹⁷²

In view of the fact that both MOS and Unit Tests were already in use in some of the subordinate commands, and in deference to variation in local conditions and needs, the tests published by the Army Ground Forces were not made mandatory. The covering letter sent with the tests stated that they were designed "to supplement and not necessarily to replace" tests already in use.¹⁷³

The testing program initiated by General McNair in 1944 produced a wider, more uniform, and more thorough checking of technical proficiency throughout the Army Ground Forces. An ultimate result was a decline in the number of "not ready" units reported by The Inspector General.¹⁷⁴

While revision of tests was getting under way, the Army Ground Forces was compelled because of urgent overseas demands to curtail the training cycle of nondivisional units. Details of the accelerated schedule, published on 14 July 1944, are set forth in the table on the opposite page. The new arrangement grouped units in three categories according to the source of their fillers. Organizations receiving the bulk of fillers from reception centers were allowed longer training periods than those which drew their personnel from replacement training centers or units of other branches; units made up of personnel from replacement training centers or organizations of the same branch as their own were allowed the shortest training period of all. The principal cut was in unit and combined training. Ordnance units, for example, under the old schedule were authorized 14 weeks for individual training, 16 for unit training, and 8 for combined training; under the accelerated program the allotments for the three periods were respectively 14, 7, and 3 weeks for all except maintenance companies which were permitted 6 additional weeks for unit training. Newly activated units and units that had been stripped were to initiate individual

training as soon as they had attained 80 percent of authorized strength and received 50 percent of their equipment. Units that were following old schedules were to adjust the remainder of their training time to the accelerated program.¹⁷⁵

The accelerated program did not prescribe combined training for antiaircraft and several types of service units, but directed them instead to devote three weeks of the unit period to training in the field. Units for which combined training was prescribed, but which for lack of opportunity had to forego this training, were directed to substitute therefor an equivalent period of intensive unit training in the field. Provision was made for subordinate commanders in exceptional cases to request extension of time allotted under the accelerated program.¹⁷⁶

The accelerated training program created an outstanding difficulty with reference to the schooling of specialists. Some types of signal, engineer, and other units were composed largely of personnel whose duties were so technical as to require them to attend service schools of several weeks' duration. Getting this personnel to school and back without disrupting the training program and impairing the integrity of the unit had been a considerable problem under the old schedule. Curtailment of the training period made this problem more acute. Schooling was accomplished in many instances only at the cost of having a majority of the personnel absent from the unit after completion of basic training.¹⁷⁷

RELATIONS BETWEEN THE ARMY GROUND FORCES AND THE ARMY SERVICE FORCES, 1944 - 1945

In 1944-1945 there was a marked trend toward closer collaboration of the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces in matters pertaining to the training of service units. Adoption by the War Department of the practice of specifically designating in each revision of the Troop Basis those units that were to be activated and trained by the Army Ground Forces and those that were to be activated and trained by the Army Service Forces probably contributed to promotion of harmony between the two commands.¹⁷⁸ In applying the new policy the War Department abandoned the scheme of allotting units of the same type to both commands for training. For example, quartermaster truck companies which in 1943 had been activated and trained in considerable numbers by both the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces, were in 1944 made the responsibility of the Army Ground Forces alone, and quartermaster service battalions, likewise formerly divided, were all given to the Army Service Forces.¹⁷⁹ The new arrangement saved duplication of effort and facilities as well as conducing to improved relationships. The argument over responsibility for training which had

ACCELERATED TRAINING OF NONDIVISIONAL UNITS

SOURCE OF FILLERS OR REPLACEMENTS

TYPE OF UNIT	RECEPTION				OTHER BRANCH				SAME BRANCH			
	CENTER				RTC OR UNIT				RTC OR UNIT			
	Ind	Unit	Comb	Total	Ind	Unit	Comb	Total	Ind	Unit	Comb	Total
	Weeks				Weeks				Weeks			
AAA												
Barrage Balloons	8	10	0	18	3	10	0	13	3	10	0	13
Brig, Gp, Hq, Opn Det	8	12	0	20	3	12	0	15	1	10	0	11
Bn & Btry AWpns	8	12	0	20	3	12	0	15	1	10	0	11
Bn & Btry Slt	8	12	0	20	3	13	0	15	1	10	0	11
Bn & Btry Gun	8	16	0	24	3	16	0	19	1	16	0	17
ARMORED												
Group Hq	14	4	4	22	5	4	4	13	1	4	4	9
Bns and Cos	14	11	4	29	5	11	4	20	1	11	4	16
CAVALRY												
Group Hq	14	4	4	22	5	4	4	13	1	4	4	9
Squadron	14	11	4	29	5	11	4	20	1	11	4	16
CHEMICAL												
Bns & Cos, Mtz	14	12	0	26	5	12	0	17	1	12	0	13
Cos, Decon, Dep, Maint	14	6	0	20	5	6	0	11	1	6	0	7
ENGINEER												
Group Hq	14	9	0	23	9	9	0	18	5	9	0	14
Bn, AB & Combat	14	13	5	32	9	13	5	27	5	13	5	23
Bn, Topo	18	15	0	33	13	15	0	28	13	15	0	28
Co, Combat	14	13	5	32	9	13	5	27	5	13	5	23
Cos, all other types	14	13	0	27	9	13	0	22	5	13	0	18
FIELD ARTILLERY												
All Units	12	11	4	27	5	11	4	20	1	11	4	16
MEDICAL												
All Units	14	9	3	26	5	9	3	17	1	9	3	13
ORDNANCE												
Hqs, Gps & Bns	14	7	3	24	8	7	3	18	4	7	3	14
Cos, Am, Dep, Evac	14	7	3	24	8	7	3	18	4	7	3	14
Cos, Maint, All types	14	13	0	27	8	13	0	21	4	13	0	17
QUARTERMASTER												
All Units	14	12	0	26	6	12	0	18	3	12	0	15
SIGNAL												
Bn, L. Cons	15	8	3	26	10	8	3	21	5	8	3	16
Bns, Operation	24	8	3	35	19	8	3	30	14	12	3	29
Bn, Separate	30	8	3	41	25	8	3	36	14	12	3	29
Co, Depot	30	8	3	41	25	8	3	36	24	8	3	35
Co, Joint Assault	31	8	3	42	26	8	3	37	14	12	3	29
Co, Photo	15	8	3	26	10	8	3	21	9	8	3	20
Co, Pigeon	15	8	3	26	10	8	3	21	9	8	3	20
Co, Rad Int	31	8	3	42	26	8	3	37	18	8	3	29
Co, Repair	30	8	3	41	25	8	3	36	24	8	3	35
Co, Radar Maint Team	33	6	3	42	27	6	3	36	27	6	3	36
TANK DESTROYER												
All Bns	14	11	4	29	3	11	4	20	1	11	4	16
Gp, Hq	14	4	4	22	5	4	4	13	1	4	4	9

reached such a high pitch in late 1942¹⁸⁰ was revived apparently in only one instance between 1 January 1944 and V-E Day. This was in reference to signal photographic companies. In January 1945 the Chief Signal Officer, Army Service Forces, complained that these units, trained by the Army Ground Forces, were not satisfactorily meeting overseas publicity requirements for still and motion pictures, because of deficiencies in technical training. Taking the position that only the Chief Signal Officer had proper facilities for the required technical training, and that the agency which had the responsibility for preparing publicity pictures for release should also have jurisdiction over selection and training of photographic personnel, he recommended that authority for training photographic signal companies be transferred from the Army Ground Forces to the Army Service Forces. The Army Ground Forces disapproved the recommendation on the ground that securing of photographs for news and historical purposes was only a secondary function of these units, that their primary mission was the taking of pictures for combat intelligence, and hence that they should be trained by a combat command. Responsibility for the training of signal photographic companies remained an AGF responsibility.¹⁸¹

Personalities constituted another factor in closer cooperation between the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces. Turnover in each of the headquarters resulted, with some exceptions, in the arrival in key positions of officers who found congeniality with their opposites in the other.¹⁸² This circumstance while fortuitous was nevertheless significant.

An evidence and result of closer collaboration was the sending of various AGF units to ASF installations for advanced functional training. In 1944 AGF chemical depot companies were sent to the Chemical Warfare Depot at Huntsville, Ala., for advanced on-the-job training; AGF signal depot companies and signal repair companies to ASF depots at Sacramento, Calif., Holabird, Md., San Antonio, Tex., Atlanta, Ga., and Lexington, Ky.; AGF engineer depot companies to the ASF depots at Memphis, Tenn., and Ogden, Utah, and AGF engineer maintenance companies to ASF equipment repair shops at Kearney, Neb., and Salina, Kan.; and AGF quartermaster depot companies to various ASF depots, including those at Charlotte, N. C., Memphis, Tenn., and New Cumberland, Md.¹⁸³

AGF control over units in training in ASF installations varied considerably in the different branches. Quartermaster depot companies sent from Camp Shelby to Memphis for functional training encamped in a park near the ASF depot. During the day the men went to the depot in such numbers as ASF authorities could conveniently employ in the handling of supplies. At night they returned to their camp. While not working at the depot, the men engaged in unit training under their own officers.¹⁸⁴

AGF signal units were placed on a detached service basis while at ASF installations. They followed training programs prepared by ASF authorities and submitted to the Army Ground Forces for information and comment. Unit commanders, under supervision of the depot commander, were responsible for basic military training and physical conditioning of their men during the period of detached service.¹⁸⁵

AGF officers, accompanied usually by their opposites in the Army Service Forces, made occasional visits of inspection to personnel in training at ASF installations.¹⁸⁶

The length of the functional training period varied with circumstances. Engineer units were usually attached to ASF depots for a thirty-day period.¹⁸⁷ In the case of signal units an attempt was made to provide a tour of duty sufficient to permit 75 percent of the specialists to obtain six weeks' training in their functional duties, but urgency of overseas requirements usually prevented attainment of this goal.¹⁸⁸

An insight into the operations of the collaborative plan and the reactions of a unit commander to its effectiveness is afforded by the following report covering training of the 728th Engineer Depot Company at the ASF Depot at Memphis, Tenn.:¹⁸⁹

This organization is now in its fourth and final week of training in the Engineer Section of this Depot and the following is submitted as statement of training accomplished.

As a result of training in the administrative section it has been possible for our officers and non-commissioned officers to work out a chart of the flow of paper work as we expect it to be done in the field, and each man can see just where his job fits in.

The entire personnel has learned from shipping and receiving sections the two all important questions: How much on hand and where is it? This was done by assigning each enlisted man to a civilian employee doing the same job the enlisted man held under the table of organization. Changes were made from time to time in order to place our men in the job most suited to them

Not only did the men get training in their own jobs but they were switched around so as to be able to do any assigned work if called upon

A highlight of the training program has been the talks by officers of the Depot to the officers and non-commissioned

officers of this organization. These officers operated depots in all the major Theaters of Operation and brought to us the problems we may encounter and how they should be overcome, giving us the points to stress while we are still training.

The training program was carried on by two methods used for two weeks each. The first method was to divide the company into groups and the groups into teams according to our table of organization. Groups were sent to various sections of the depot and rotated. For the second period of two weeks entire platoons were sent to the same sections and rotated. The second method was preferred, since the officers and non-commissioned officers could instruct their own men and change them to proper T/O positions. Also the men taught each other and learned how much they could depend on each other under pressure. Every opportunity was given to each man to show initiative in his own job and leaders were thereby selected.

Immediately upon arrival here the men were told that the facilities for training were available here, and that what they got out of the training depended upon how they applied themselves to their assignments. With few exceptions the interest has been keen and the enthusiasm high.

Critiques were held daily at which time all were given the opportunity to ask questions and express their opinions of the days operations. A list of questions was given the men and they brought back the answers the next day

Reactions of Special Staff Section chiefs at Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, were also quite favorable. The AGF Engineer officer stated in May 1945:¹⁹⁰

Cooperation has been splendid. This is the only way that Ground units can get plenty of materiel on which to work.

The AGF Signal officer said:¹⁹¹

We had long realized that a person who had had basic and unit training in AGF and specialist training or a service school was not a completely trained person ... advanced on-the-job training at ASF Depots has worked out very satisfactorily.

Service rendered to ASF depots by AGF units in the course of their functional training was a secondary consideration, but in some instances it seems to have been outstanding. In June 1944 the commanding officer

of the Ogden, Utah, ASF Depot, from which one AGF engineer unit had just been graduated, requested immediate assignment of another unit to take its place. "The labor situation in this area is critical," he wrote. "Facilities exist at this depot for quartering a depot company and its value to the Engineer Section of the Depot is unquestioned ... since this depot is the west coast key and reserve depot for engineer supplies, the approaching peak activities connected with supply for the Japanese campaign place a maximum load upon the depot. It is urgently recommended that a depot company be transferred to this depot for training in the immediate future and that such a company be left at this depot until ordered overseas."¹⁹²

Another instance of closer cooperation between the Army Ground Forces and the Army Service Forces in 1944 was the borrowing of ASF officers to assist in AGF maintenance inspections. The maintenance inspection team which Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, kept in the field a large portion of the time throughout 1944 and the early months of 1945 habitually included representatives of the Chief of Ordnance and the Quartermaster General. Request for loan of the ASF officers sprang primarily from the fact that the AGF Ordnance and Quartermaster officers did not have enough assistants to permit sending of their own personnel. The ASF officers in the inspections concerned themselves primarily with technical matters; they did not inspect or evaluate training as such. Copies of their reports were sent both to their chiefs in the Army Service Forces and to Headquarters, Army Ground Forces.¹⁹³

Occasionally ASF officers were borrowed by Special Staff Sections of the Army Ground Forces to assist in various other matters that were primarily technical in character. In one instance, for example, the AGF Engineer asked a representative of the Chief of Engineers to assist in the inspection of two engineer camouflage companies, one of which had to be inactivated. The two units were put through their paces before the AGF and the ASF representatives, and on the basis of this performance, the AGF officer, relying on the advice of his ASF opposite as to technical aspects, decided which was to be inactivated.¹⁹⁴

The trend toward closer cooperation in 1944 was most marked in matters pertaining to training literature and other publications. In May 1945, the AGF Quartermaster officer stated:¹⁹⁵

For the past year all technical and training literature issued by the office of the Quartermaster General has been sent to the AGF Quartermaster for review prior to publication, and vice versa. Material sent to us for criticism and comment included MTP's, courses of instruction at Quartermaster schools, including officer candidate schools, specialist courses, and even posters on materiel conservation. There is a full and

free exchange of opinion on every publication put out by either the Quartermaster General or the AGF Quartermaster. This works to the mutual advantage of both. We benefit particularly from the advice of their specialists

The Quartermaster General passes on to us reports of all observers sent out by him to the theaters. Moreover, we are invited over to talk with some of the observers personally so that we may share the benefits of their observations

Beginning in the summer of 1944, the Chief Signal Officer submitted to the AGF Signal officer drafts of proposed signal MTP's for comment and suggestion. The AGF Signal officer was also consulted about revisions of courses in ASF Signal schools attended by AGF personnel.¹⁹⁶

It would be misleading to leave the impression that the trend toward closer cooperation in 1944 was universal and steady. In some of the services it was only faint, and in others, partial. One AGF Section chief, for instance, while reporting a closer collaboration with reference to the use of ASF facilities for advanced functional training, complained of increased difficulty in 1944 in getting AGF specialists admitted to service schools in the required numbers because of a tendency of the branch chief to give preference to ASF personnel in the allotment of quotas.¹⁹⁷ It should be noted also that collaborative action sometimes originated on the secondary level -- between the AGF Section chief and his opposite in the Army Service Forces -- and moved from there upward. In one instance the plan to train AGF units at ASF installations while strongly favored by the AGF section chief and the branch chief in the Army Service Forces was opposed initially by their superiors. The two chiefs, by informal collaboration, were able eventually to generate enough pressure to overcome the opposition and to secure adoption of the plan.¹⁹⁸

Divergence of viewpoint among the Special Staff Sections as to the extent of collaboration with chiefs of the services in the training of ground personnel is well illustrated by recommendations made prior to V-E Day by the AGF Ordnance officer and the AGF Signal officer. The former, motivated by belief that the Army Service Forces was better equipped than the Army Ground Forces for the training of individual specialists, recommended that in the period after V-E Day the Army Service Forces maintain a pool of 1,800 ordnance specialists, trained by the Army Service Forces for use as fillers and replacements in Ground units.¹⁹⁹ The Ground Signal officer, on the other hand, stating the view that "there is a distinct difference in theoretical training standards between Ground, Air and Service Force signal personnel," advocated that the Army Ground Forces no longer be required to look to the Army Service Forces for training of signal specialists and replacements, but that it establish schools and replacement training centers of its own for training of such personnel.²⁰⁰

The weight of sentiment in the Army Ground Forces at V-E Day and throughout seemed to favor the position stated by the Ground Signal officer. Principal basis for this sentiment was the feeling that AGF personnel required a distinct type of training to fit it properly for service in ground units, and that the Army Service Forces tended to think first of its own needs in training and allocating personnel trained in ASF installations.²⁰¹

On one point there seems to have been near unanimity in the Army Ground Forces: namely, that policy should be revised to give the Army Ground Forces control of ground-trained personnel returning from overseas. Complaint was frequent and bitter in Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, that the Army Service Forces used its control of the processing of individual returnees to screen out the best for its own use and thus leave the dregs for ground organizations.²⁰²

PERSISTENT OBSTACLES TO EFFECTIVE TRAINING, 1942 - 1945

Problems of Personnel

The training of nondivisional units was encumbered throughout by enormous difficulties. The most formidable and persistent unquestionably was shortage of competent personnel. This problem was most acute in the summer of 1942, when adoption of the "Roundup" plan for invading northwestern Europe the following spring created unanticipated requirements for service units, and again in the summer of 1944 when unusual demands arose in connection with movement into France.

On 30 June 1942 the enlisted strength of spare parts in Army Ground Forces was more than 120,000 below that authorized by tables of organization. Three months later the deficiency had increased to a figure exceeding 150,000. The shortage on each date was about 30 percent of the authorized strength. By the end of the year the stepping up of inductions, the curtailment of activations, and the abandonment of "Roundup" had improved the situation somewhat, but even so deficiencies at that time approximated 120,000, a figure representing 20 percent of authorized strength.²⁰³

Composite figures do not tell the complete story. Some nondivisional units had full table of organization strength, and some indeed had surpluses, but amplitude usually did not come until movement overseas was in immediate prospect. And the filling of alerted organizations was achieved in most cases by robbing units in intermediate stages of training. Units thus despoiled were compelled either to hobble along at reduced strength or to replenish their rosters from reception centers. The bringing in of green fillers meant, of course, the launching

of basic training all over again. It was not unusual for an organization to be forced, through repeated withdrawals of personnel for cadre, OCS, and transfers, to go through basic training several times. Then when finally alerted it was often so far below authorized strength as to require it in turn to rob some unit of lower priority before leaving port.²⁰⁴ This circle was a vicious one, inimical alike to orderly training and to morale.

Delay in the provision of fillers and the use of tactical units as replacement training centers were wasteful of time and supervisory personnel, and this at a period when the Army was hard-pressed for both. An Army Ground Force study in November 1942 brought out the fact that of 31 units used for replacement training, the personnel required to operate these units could, if utilized in replacement centers, train twice as many replacements as were trained in the units.²⁰⁵

As implied above, personnel deficiencies were greatest among units in early stages of training. It was not uncommon in 1942 for a company to remain at skeleton strength for several months after activation waiting for fillers. When fillers finally began to arrive, they frequently came in dribblets, requiring either a further delay in the launching of the training program, or the conduct of training on more than one level, or both.²⁰⁶

A considerable amount of the turnover in personnel experienced by nondivisional units was produced by transfer to the Air Forces and inroads of OCS quotas. These losses had an adverse effect on the general quality of Army Ground Forces enlisted personnel. General McNair reported to General Marshall in February 1943 that the character of manpower in units under his jurisdiction "declined visibly toward the end of 1942."²⁰⁷ A specific illustration was afforded by seven Tank Destroyer battalions which after heavy losses to Army Air Forces and officer candidate schools found themselves with over 50 percent of their personnel in classes IV and V of the Army General Classification Test (AGCT), whereas normal distribution was 32 percent in these classes.²⁰⁸

In early 1942 the problem of those responsible for nondivisional training was complicated also by the fact that such plans for building nondivisional units as existed contemplated provision of fillers by replacement training centers. But this expectation, never realized to any considerable extent, had to be entirely abandoned during the early stages of "Roundup" preparations and the training set-up regeared to accommodate the policy of dumping the raw materials of reception centers directly upon tactical units.²⁰⁹

Nondivisional training was also handicapped in 1942 by the prevalent dearth and incompetence of officers.²¹⁰ Ample and efficient commissioned personnel was perhaps more vital to spare parts than to divi-

sions because of their relative lack of supervision and the technical nature of much of their training.

On 30 June 1942 nondivisional units in Army Ground Forces had only 15,013 officers of an authorized strength of 22,293, and three months later only 19,931 of an authorized 27,141. Shortages were most pronounced in engineer, signal, ordnance, and field artillery units.²¹¹ Typical units of these branches in the lean days prior to December 1942 sometimes had no more than one-third of their authorized commissioned strength present for duty.²¹² By the end of the year, owing to a tremendous increase in OCS output in the summer and fall,²¹³ the over-all officer picture had changed from deficiency to surplus (actual strength 29,369; authorized strength 28,789) but, even so, shortages persisted in some categories, particularly in the signal and engineer branches.

The urgent demand for leaders produced by the rapid activation of units resulted too often in hasty selection and premature promotion of officers.²¹⁴ The dire need of technical specialists in some of the service categories led to the direct commissioning of large numbers of civilians. The process known as affiliation was frequently invoked, particularly by ordnance and signal authorities. Under this scheme, a telephone corporation was asked to furnish officer and enlisted personnel for an entire signal construction company, and an automobile manufacturer was called on to provide an ordnance maintenance company. It was contemplated that affiliated personnel should be given a thorough course in military training, but importunities for service units were frequently so great as drastically to curtail instruction. Affiliation gave the services vitally needed specialists and, for enlisted personnel, technical proficiency was perhaps the overshadowing consideration. But the same was not true of the officers. Company commanders and executives had to be familiar with Army organization, customs of the service, and unit administration in order effectively to discharge their duties.²¹⁵

The consequences of placing men in command of units before they learned their military ABC's produced results that were sometimes farcical and sometimes tragic. Perhaps the worst consequences were those pertaining to discipline. In the automobile plant the assembly line foreman had been addressed by his underlings in the free and easy spirit of "Hi Joe." When affiliation placed the group in uniform, "Joe," by virtue of his supervisory status as a civilian, became a captain. But the workers, suddenly converted into sergeants, corporals, and privates, found it difficult, notwithstanding the shining bars, the salutes, and the plethora of correctly intoned "sirs" to think of their captain in any other light than "Joe." The situation naturally was not helped by "Joe's" maladroitness in giving commands and his bungling of company administration.²¹⁶

Blanket condemnation of personnel commissioned directly from civilian life would be unfair. Some of the men thrust into positions of command had natural qualities of leadership, learned military ways with remarkable celerity, and in a short time became good officers. Their technical knowledge was of inestimable benefit to the armed forces. Many of the hurriedly selected nonspecialist products of Officer Candidate School, promoted rapidly to posts of considerable responsibility, also gave remarkably good account of themselves. But, even so, paucity of capable leaders was one of the outstanding hindrances to spare parts training during the early period of Army Ground Forces. General Marshall noted some of the unhappy consequences in the form of shabby appearance and slack discipline among organizations during his tour of the North African Theater early in 1943,²¹⁷ and when he returned urged the importance of corrective action. A War Department staff member, reporting a conference with the Chief of Staff at this time, stated:²¹⁸

During this discussion the Chief of Staff very pointedly made an issue of the training of battalions and regimental commanders, especially of service units. He commented on the lack of high quality of leadership among otherwise well qualified technical commanders. He stressed the imperative necessity for training of these commanders in battle field leadership. In concluding this particular part of the discussion he stated in substantially these words: "I do not give a ____ whether the commander has perfect technical training or not. He does not have to have it if his subordinates have it. What he must have is the leadership and drive necessary to get the right things done at the right time in battle. For example, the commander of a hospital does not have to be a doctor."

General Floyd L. Parks, Chief of Staff, Army Ground Forces, on receiving a report of bad disciplinary conditions in an AGF tank destroyer battalion in August 1942, remarked forthrightly that leadership was "woefully lacking." "I am not worrying about the qualities of the enlisted men," he said, "but I am extraordinarily alarmed at the dearth of leaders. It will take us quite a while to eliminate the deadwood and bring out the men of ability and character."²¹⁹ Future experience showed the accuracy of his prediction.

During the first few months of 1943, owing largely to the abandonment of the "Roundup" project and a slowing down of the rate of mobilization, personnel resources in general were adequate for nondivisional requirements. But in the fall the situation took an unfavorable turn, and by the end of the year spare parts reported an aggregate enlisted understrength of nearly twenty thousand.²²⁰

It might be expected that the large officer surplus which existed after the summer of 1943 would have solved the needs of all units as far as commissioned personnel was concerned. Such was not the case. Some of the technical services continued to be seriously hampered by an insufficiency of competent officers. In the case of Engineers, the general surplus of commissioned personnel actually proved a handicap, because it brought a halt to the commissioning of civilian and enlisted specialists and led instead to the transfer to Engineer units of officers who lacked technical qualifications for their new assignments.²²¹

Medical units experienced the most acute shortages of commissioned personnel. On 30 November 1943 ground medical units reported a deficiency of 1,505 officers out of an authorized strength of 5,961. Circumstances pointed to a situation even more distressing in the future.²²²

In the spring and summer of 1944 nondivisional units experienced a leanness of personnel comparable to that of 1942. In May 1944, when manpower resources were being drained to the limit in preparation for the invasion of Western Europe, an AGF staff officer who had just returned from a visit of inspection stated in his "conclusions": "Difficulties encountered by units during individual training periods are believed to be 80% personnel and 10% supply problems, and 10% lack of training facilities, ..." The AGF G-3 scribbled in the margin opposite this comment: "The talk is about personnel, regardless of who goes out."²²³

One aspect of the personnel problem in 1944 was delay in receipt of fillers for newly activated units. Engineer units experienced this difficulty to a greater extent than those of other branches. In May 1944, many engineer combat battalions urgently needed overseas were marking time at cadre strength because of lack of available fillers.²²⁴ An AGF staff officer reported in mid-July that the 286th Engineer Combat Battalion activated 17 December 1943 had to postpone initiation of the individual training program until 10 March 1944, by which time only about 50 percent of fillers had been received and that arrival of the remainder on 5 April 1944 necessitated the beginning of a second echelon of training. He stated further that the 1272d Engineer Combat Battalion activated on 20 April 1944 had by mid-July received only 65 percent of its fillers.²²⁵

Officer shortages, while considerably less serious on the whole than in 1942-43, remained conspicuous in medical units, and to some extent in engineer units, throughout 1944. In September 1944 there was a deficiency of about 44 percent in the authorized commissioned strength of AGF medical units.²²⁶ Shortages were more pronounced in professional specialist categories, such as surgeons and neurologists. A conference of ASF, AAF, and AGF representatives in the fall of 1944

for redistribution of medical officers resulted in some improvement of conditions in the Army Ground Forces.²²⁷

One of the outstanding difficulties experienced by nondivisional units in 1944 was turnover of personnel. In November 1944 an AGF staff officer reported that several quartermaster units in three months time had had more than a 100-percent turnover of enlisted strength.²²⁸ Personnel losses of from 50 to 75 percent seem to have been fairly common among all types of nondivisional units except antiaircraft, tank destroyer, and tank battalions.

Several factors contributed to this enormous turnover. First was the discontinuance early in 1944 of the practice of authorizing units at activation an overstrength to offset losses from normal attrition, thus making it necessary for these units when alerted to replenish their rosters by drafts on organizations of lower priority.²²⁹ Second was the accumulation in the Army Ground Forces of large numbers of physically handicapped (Class D) men and insistence by the War Department until the latter part of 1944 that these men be tried out in various capacities with a view of finding a place where they could be usefully employed. In many cases personnel not disqualified for overseas service but physically handicapped to an extent that they were extremely hard to place, were passed from one unit to another in an effort to find suitable assignments for them.²³⁰ In September 1944 G-1 wrote to the Chief of Staff, AGF:²³¹

The War Department has consistently exerted heavy pressure on Army Ground Forces to utilize everyone who could do useful work. They authorized the induction not only of limited service personnel but for several months they authorized the induction of 5% who were below the minimum standards of induction for limited service. Prior to the use of the profile system such personnel were habitually assigned to the Army Ground Forces and many trials were required before we could find spots where they might fit in.

In the fall of 1944, War Department policy was changed to permit the Army Ground Forces to get rid of large numbers of Class D personnel, either through discharge or by transfer to the Army Air Forces and the Army Service Forces.²³² This provision, while obviously well-intended, had the effect of greatly accelerating turnover of personnel.²³³ The Fourth Army alone in the period 1 September - 31 December 1944 removed 30,000 physically handicapped men from T/O units.²³⁴ Replacements for those cleared from units in advanced stages of training had to be taken from low priority organizations.

Turnover of personnel was also increased by the practice, common in the summer and fall of 1944, of shipping units before completion

of the prescribed training period to meet urgent and unexpected overseas requirements.²³⁵ Units whose readiness dates were thus advanced frequently were unable to secure the return of specialists from service schools prior to shipment, but were compelled to draft substitutes from other units. In the fall of 1944 the War Department at one stroke ordered shipment in current status of training -- i.e., before completion of the prescribed training period -- of 65 engineer combat battalions. Because of this action, 1,800 specialists in attendance at service schools were unable to rejoin their units. Unalerted engineer units were combed for substitutes, but since these sources were too limited to meet the requisition, the alerted organizations had to fill many of the specialist positions with ordinary fillers lacking in the required technical training.²³⁶

The practice of transferring personnel found deficient in POM requirements from an alerted unit to an organization of lower priority was sometimes repeated as many as a half dozen times.²³⁷ The armies wanted to maintain casual detachments in headquarters and headquarters detachments, special troops, for storage and processing of such personnel,²³⁸ but Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, did not favor the plan.²³⁹ Objection seems to have sprung mainly from fear that pooling of the "floaters" would have an adverse effect on their morale.²⁴⁰

The processing of outgoing and incoming men placed a heavy burden of administration on battalion and company headquarters. Moreover, the breaking in of replacements was disruptive to training. But the most serious consequence of all, perhaps, was the injury of personnel changes to unit esprit and teamwork.

Turnover of personnel would have been considerably less extensive and less disruptive if pools of trained personnel, including qualified specialists, had been maintained in AGF for each of the branches. If such pools had been provided, alerted units might have drawn on them for loss replacements instead of robbing units of lower priority. The need for reserve pools was repeatedly urged by chiefs of special staff sections in the Army Ground Forces, but mainly because demands of theaters for units and replacements were so pressing as to prevent escape from a hand-to-mouth basis, pools were not provided prior to V-E Day.²⁴¹

Quality of personnel continued to be a serious obstacle to training in 1944. As the nation's manpower resources approached exhaustion under existing Selective Service policies, there was a decline in the quality of personnel coming to units through reception centers, and after adoption of the profile system, the best of the inductees went to the infantry. To an increasing extent in 1944, nondivisional units received their fillers from organizations declared surplus in the troop

basis, and from the Army's floating population of casualties, which to a considerable degree was made up of slough-offs of alerted units.²⁴² A vivid glimpse of the dregs received by some organizations is afforded by the following excerpt from an inspection report, dated 20 June 1944, of an AGF artillery officer:²⁴³

415th FA Group: CAC transferred 62 men which are in general hospitals over the United States. Twenty were in station hospitals of converted CAC units. Seventy-two men are blind in one eye; 17 are without an eye; 259 have only one good eye above 20/400.

417th FA group: CAC transferred 25 men, absent in general hospitals, 110 men unqualified to go overseas; 18 psycho-neurosis and 6 epileptics.

207th FA Group: CAC transferred 50 Class "C" men to each of 3 battalions; two other battalions have 11 per battalion with only one eye; 65 are physically disqualified for drill.

All above men are discards from previously alerted AA and CAC units. They are a serious handicap to training, will never go overseas in a combat unit, and should be discharged. This is only an average example of these problems.

The practice of high priority units dumping their culls on low priority organizations resulted, as deployment neared completion, in accumulation in the last units activated of a disproportionate quantity of "eight-balls" for which the usual repository -- i.e., units of the same branch in earlier stages of training -- did not exist. In other words, the process of successive dumpings ran out for lack of units on which to unload. Revisions in personnel policy in August 1944, as noted above, authorized discharge of physically unfit, but by that time replacement sources had become so impoverished that application of the policy often resulted in the exchange of a man of weak body but good training for one of fair stamina, but little training, and possessed possibly of sundry other defects.²⁴⁴

Insistence by higher headquarters in the early months of 1944 that every effort be made to utilize Class D men and the practice of assigning the best physical specimens to the infantry, resulted frequently in throwing upon nondivisional units, particularly those of service categories, a heavier load of substandard personnel than they could effectively absorb.²⁴⁵ In some instances, divisions were favored over spare parts in personnel matters to an extent that was detrimental

to the latter. In July 1944, the Fourth Army directed the commanding officer of a headquarters and headquarters detachment, special troops, to screen all physically qualified men from low priority signal, ordnance, and quartermaster units of his command and report them as available for transfer to divisions as replacements for infantry losses.²⁴⁶

Problems of Equipment

A second outstanding obstacle to nondivisional training was inadequacy of equipment. The difficulties of divisions in the connection, as noted elsewhere,²⁴⁷ were formidable, but the experience of spare parts was considerably more distressing, owing to failure to set up a minimum equipment list for these as for divisions, and the special dependence of such units on equipment for adequate training.

The problem of equipment was particularly acute in 1942. At Camp Hood, in the spring and summer of 1942, "simulated tank destroyers maneuvered against simulated tanks over terrain almost devoid of roads, firing was conducted on improvised ranges ... and so few radios were available that practically no communications training could be given."²⁴⁸ Artillery officers throughout Army Ground Forces were directed in April as a result of the cutting of ammunition allowances by one-third "to fire a simulated problem each day ... using a match-box, sandtable, some sort of terrain board, or any other expedient," and to put their batteries through simulated service practices.²⁴⁹

Signal communications units could not well improvise technical equipment, nor could ordnance and quartermaster maintenance companies service imaginary tanks and trucks. The result of the pervasive shortages of specialist and functional equipment for these and other service organizations was inevitably a loss of training opportunity and the filling of the importunate requests for overseas assignment with poorly prepared units. Shortages of small arms for service units, because of their low priority, were even more pronounced than deficiencies of other types of equipment.²⁵⁰

The straits to which many nondivisional units were reduced in 1942 can best be illustrated by citation from inspection reports of a few specific instances. On 17 June 1942, Col. John W. Middleton of the AGF G-4 Section reported, after a visit to four camps:²⁵¹

1. 67th QM Troop (Pack) - "Members of this organization have not been issued their animals ... they are over 41 pack horses short and short 294 mules."

2. Co. C, 53d QM Regiment (HM). "Short cartridge belts, haversacks, pack carriers, and water containers."

3. Co. D, 53d QM Regiment (HM). "Shortage of tentage, shelter halves, web equipment, field ranges, and motor vehicles."

Following an inspection of Signal units at Camp Crowder, another Army Ground Forces staff officer noted on 26 June 1942:²⁵²

1. 93d Signal Battalion, activated 18 May 1942. "The arrival of Signal Corps equipment is far behind schedule. In many cases the equipment received is such that little if any training of some types can be accomplished ... no telephones of any kind have been received precluding not only training in switchboard and switchboard operation, but also wire construction."

2. 96th Signal Battalion, activated 14 June 1942. "Not one solitary item of Signal Corps equipment has been received."

3. 179th Signal Repair Company, activated 15 May 1942. "Signal Corps equipment received consists largely of many items which cannot be used for training purposes without the receipt of key items such as telephones, switchboards, etc."

A special survey made in November 1942 by the Inspector General's Department of service units under Army Ground Force control affords the most comprehensive picture of the equipment situation:²⁵³

1. 63d QM Battalion ... "There are only 284 rifles for 1,113 men."

2. 663d Engineer Topo. Co. "Progress in technical training has been delayed by a lack of drafting material and aerial photographs."

3. Company A, 302d QM Battalion, Sterilization. "Activated, 1 May 1942, has had very little opportunity for technical training, there being no clothing and personnel to practice on."

4. 23d Chemical Co. (Decon). "Has completed eight weeks of MTP training, has not been issued either antigas impregnated or impervious clothing."

5. 193d Ordnance Company (Depot) and 60th Chemical Company (Depot). "Had no prospect of stores to handle or warehouses in which to work."

6. 3d Convalescent Hospital. "Has little chance for development ... because of shortage in T/BA equipment and the lack of useful work to perform."

7. 25th and 33d Chemical Decontamination Companies. "The original allotment of training munitions and agents was exhausted during the initial training period and replacement not obtainable to date."

8. 479th Engineer Maintenance Company. "Lacked mobile repair equipment."

Nondivisional combat units were somewhat better situated with reference to equipment than were service organizations, but the plight of most units in both categories in 1942 was deplorable. An AGF staff member remarked at the end of the year: "Small, separate units have been a weak spot of training in 1942."²⁵⁴

The question naturally arises: how did the scantily equipped organizations acquire even a small degree of proficiency in performing the duties required of them? The answer lies to a large extent in the capacity of unit and higher commanders for perseverance, and their ingenuity in borrowing, pooling, and improvising. Blocks of wood were used for mines, sandbags for ammunition boxes, galvanized iron pipes mounted on ration carts for artillery, sticks for guns, and "jeeps" for tanks, not to mention a long list of mock structures, ranging from landing craft to "Nazi villages."²⁵⁵ To a large extent nondivisional training in 1942 represented a sequence of assumptions, simulations, and expedients.

The equipment situation improved somewhat in the early months of 1943, but even so, many units, particularly those in early stages of training, continued to be hampered by serious shortages.

In April 1943, General McNair, convinced that many of the deficiencies revealed by United States troops in combat were due to inadequacies of training equipment, urged the War Department to change existing policies so that nondivisional units could get 50 percent of their equipment (instead of the 20 percent then authorized) at activation and 100 percent at the end of four months. But no action was taken on this recommendation.²⁵⁶

By the summer of 1943 increasing production of American factories made it possible for some units in early stages of training to obtain a substantial amount of training equipment in excess of the 20 percent allotted to them at activation. But this favorable situation was up-

set by adoption, at the suggestion of Army Service Forces, of a policy of preshipping equipment to Great Britain. Hitherto the practice had been followed of shipping units and equipment together. The new policy provided that equipment should be stockpiled in Great Britain ahead of time, and that when units in training departed for ports of embarkation they should leave their guns, tanks, and trucks behind.²⁵⁷

Army Ground Forces was apprehensive of the effects of preshipment, and it did cause a temporary decline in the flow of equipment to units in training. In the long run the policy proved a benefit. The pressure brought to bear on factories to turn out large quantities of equipment so that it could be moved across the sea during the summer and autumn months while British shipping and port facilities were less strained than usual resulted in a speedup of production. Moreover, the release of equipment by units when they were ordered to ports of embarkation made this equipment almost immediately available to units in training.²⁵⁸

In 1944 - 1945 equipment became available in increasingly large quantities, but shortages were reported at various times and in certain items until the end of the war in Europe. In April 1945 the Chief of the AGF Engineer Section stated:²⁵⁹

Until recently we had shortages of all types of equipment. The situation improved for a while in the early months of 1944, then it became bad again, as theater demands increased and as the Army Service Forces began to call in equipment for rehabilitation in preparation for overseas shipment. For the past six months we have had only one M-2 Treadway Bridge in the Army Ground Forces, and it had to be used primarily for testing purposes; recently we even lost that. The Ground Forces got its first 2½ ton dump truck for training purposes about February 1945.

Deficiencies were most common and most outstanding in newly developed items, such as carrier equipment (for sending messages of various frequencies over the same channel) and speech security equipment for signal units and transporter equipment for ordnance units.²⁶⁰

CONCLUSIONS

In the early period of Army Ground Forces, divisions enjoyed definite priority over the training of spare parts, particularly those falling in service categories. The preferred status of the large units

was manifest in the fact that detailed plan for the systematic production of divisions was developed at the inception of the Army Ground Forces, while a similar plan for the building and training of spare parts was not formulated until March 1943, too late, in view of subsequent personnel shortages, to be of great benefit. The initial focusing of emphasis on divisional training was attributable in part at least to the belief that small units could in general be trained more quickly and with less difficulty than divisions. Experiences of 1942 indicated that this conception was unsound, and that the production of dependable and smoothly functioning spare parts required no less careful planning, no less close supervision, and hardly, if any, less time than the larger units that they were to support in combat. But serious and persistent personnel shortages permitted only a partial application of this important lesson. The training of spare parts received relatively greater emphasis after 1942, but even so, the role of small units seems to have been secondary to that of divisions as long as any of the latter remained in the Army Ground Forces; and after the divisions left, the spotlight tended to turn to replacements. Reports of The Inspector General leave the impression that personnel and training deficiencies of alerted units throughout the history of the Army Ground Forces were much more common among spare parts than among divisions.

Some of the Special Staff personnel of Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, were strongly of the opinion that the training of service units suffered because of a preference of the arms over the services in the planning and the administration of the training program. They complained of a reluctance in both Headquarters, Army Ground Forces, and subordinate commands to take Special Staff officers fully into counsel and to clothe them with essential authority.²⁶¹ In April 1945, the Ground Ordnance officer wrote to G-3:²⁶²

There has been a continued tendency on the part of subordinate commands, as well as this headquarters, to de-emphasize the responsibilities of the ordnance staff officer in these maintenance matters. In fact the Replacement and School Command, for example, does not even have as a part of its headquarters an ordnance section. Another typical example is the Antiaircraft Command ... in which the ordnance officer of the command must justify to a representative of the office of chief of staff the inspection or visit he plans to make before he can make such an inspection to determine maintenance practices and adequacy of maintenance training in subordinate units ... Experience in theaters of operations has proven beyond any possible contention the need for strong Special Staff Sections to supervise, inspect and advise in maintenance matters.

The Ground Ordnance officer also objected strongly to what he regarded as a neglect of the services in the training programs prepared by G-3 for the second or Japanese phase of the war.²⁶³

The view was held by some that relegation of the services to a secondary position in the Army Ground Forces caused an over-stressing of military subjects in service units and the allotment of insufficient time and attention to functional training. "The overwhelming sentiment of the theaters is that we should devote more time to training in engineer duties," said the Ground Engineer in May 1945, "and less time to marching and shooting. The theater people say that their primary need is road builders but that we send them men who are good at shooting and fighting but who are lacking in ability to organize and execute engineer projects."²⁶⁴

It is not unlikely that neglect of service units and of other spare parts was often more imagined than real. However that may be, it seems safe to conclude that despite many difficulties of personnel, equipment, and supervision, the training of nondivisional units improved during most of the AGF period and that units leaving port in the early months of 1945 were considerably better qualified for performing their missions than were those sent overseas in 1942.

Notes

(Problems of Nondivisional Training in the AGF)

1. This statement is based on a study of reports, "Comparative Strength of the Army" and "Uniform Strength of the Army" prepared by the Ground Statistics Section and filed in 320.2 (Comp Str) (S), and for the period June - December 1942 on occasional comparative strength reports filed in the records of the Ground Statistics Section (S). Training units, such as those of schools and replacement centers, are not included in the category of nondivisional units.

2. Ibid.

3. "Spare parts" is a term of uncertain origin applied to nondivisional units throughout the AGF period.

4. History of AGF, Study No 8, Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat, p 118.

5. Compilation "AGF Units." In files of AGF G-3 Mob Div.

6. This statement is based on interviews by the AGF Historical Officer with special staff heads and various members of AGF G-3 Section, January 1944.

7. (1) Memo of Col Lowell W. Rocks, Chief of AGF Tng Div, for Gen McNair, 21 May 42, sub: Comment on ltr of Gen Lear, May 18, 42. AGF G-3 files, McNair 201 Binder. (2) Memo (S) of Brig Gen W. S. Paul, G-4, AGF for Sec GS, 28 Jun 42, sub: TUB 42. 320.2/283 (S). (3) Memo (S) of Brig Gen W. S. Paul to CofS AGF, undated (but early Jul 42) sub: Condition of Non-Div Serv Units. 320.2/283 (S). (4) AGF memo (S) to CofS USA, 3 Aug 42, sub: Pers and Tng Status of Units of AGF. 320.2/283 (S). (5) Statement of Col J. B. Hughes to AGF Hist Off, 29 Jan 44.

8. AGF M/S (S) G-3 to Plans, 4 Dec 42, sub: Activation of Nondivisional Units. 320.2/283 (S).

9. See pp 102 - 103 below.

10. (1) Memo of CofS AGF to G-3 WD, 9 Apr 42, sub: Agency or Agencies to Activate Units. 320.2/1915 (Strength). (2) Memo of CofS AGF to G-3 WD, 9 May 42, sub: Responsibility for Tng. 353/1267.

11. WD memo WDGCT (5-30-42) to CGs AGF, AAF, ASF, 30 May 42, sub: Responsibility for Tng. 353/1389.

12. Memo of Opns AGF to G-3 WD, 11 Jun 42, sub: Responsibility for the Activation of Units. 320.2/4488.

13. (1) Ibid. (2) WD memo WDGCT 320.2 (6-20-42) for CGs AGF, AAF, SOS, 20 June 42, sub: Responsibility for the Activation of Serv Units. 320.2/4733. (3) The list was extended on 15 July 1942, WD memo WDGCT 320.2 (7-2-42) for CGs, 15 Jul 42, sub: Guide to Responsibility for Activation of Certain Units. 320.2/473.

14. Memo of Brig Gen Philip E. Brown for CG AGF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Sp Survey of AGF Serv Units other than Div. 333.1/1415 (Insp, Fld Forces).

15. Brig Gen Philip E. Brown's report included the statement: Cp Blanding. 33rd Chem Decon Co, activated Aug 10 1942, and 25th Chem Decon Co activated March 25, 1942 -- "There is a complete lack of coordinated information and training literature on decontamination subjects." Ibid.

16. Memo of TIG for Gen George C. Marshall, CofS USA, 20 Apr 42, sub: Hq Third Army. 322/4 (Third Army).

17. Statement of Gen Ben Lear, former CG Second Army, to AGF Hist Off, 14 Oct 43.

18. (1) Personal ltr Gen Ben Lear to CG 9th Div, 16 Jun 42. Second Army files, AG 353.01-2 (Inf). (2) Statement of Col J. W. Younger, Gd QM (formerly QM Second Army) to AGF Hist Off, 25 Jan 44. (3) Personal ltrs Lt Gen H. J. Brees, CG Third Army to Gen McNair, 7, 11 Jan, 4 Feb 41. GHQ 353/7 (Third Army). (4) In one instance at least, some service units were attached to a corps area for supervision. See memo, Lt Col E. V. McAtee, G-4 AGF to CofS, 6 Apr 42, sub: Rpt of Visit to the 82nd Div, Hq Third Army, and 90th Div. 333.1/748 (Insp Fld Forces).

19. Statement of Col J. B. Sherman, Plans Sec, AGF to AGF Hist Off, 8 Jan 44. Col Sherman was formerly in the G-3 Sec, Hq Second Army.

20. Memo (C) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 25 Apr 42 (no subject). 333/2 (C).

21. AGF M/S (C) CofS to G-3, 23 Apr 42, sub: Administration in Army Corps. 322/1 (Hq and Hq Det Spec Trs)(C).

22. In October 1942 the authorized strength of Type A Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments was increased to 6 officers and 20 enlisted men and Type B to 8 officers and 32 enlisted men. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 20 Oct 42, sub: Orgn of Comd of Army and GHQ Trs. 322/4 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(R).

23. For copies of these letters see binders 322 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(C) for Second Army, Third Army, II Corps, and VII Corps in AGF Records.

24. Telg of Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 29 May 42. 322/1 (Hq and Hq Det)(Second Army).

25. As early as December 1940 the Commanding General of the 5th Division, burdened with the task of supervising not only spare parts at his own station but at three other stations as well, requested General Lear's permission to set up a small headquarters for supervision of small army units located at Ft. Knox, Ky. The request was disapproved on account of lack of officers. History of AGF, Study No 16, History of the Second Army.

26. Second Army ltr AG 322-43 (F) to Lt Col Ben Stafford, 29 Dec 41. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

27. Second Army ltr to Col George Byers, 18 Apr 42. Second Army Records, Byers, George, 201 File:

28. Telg of Gen Lear to Gen McNair, 29 May 42. 322/1 (Hq and Hq Det)(Second Army).

29. These figures are from compilations "AGF Units" in files of AGF G-3 Mob Div.

30. For an illustration of the type letter written to the CO of each of the Hq and Hq Dets Sp Trs in Second Army see copy of ltr (C) of Gen Lear to Col (later Brig Gen) Wm H. Wilbur, 24 Jun 42, 322/11 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(C).

31. Ibid.

32. Memo (C) of Col (later Maj Gen) Clyde L. Hyssong, AG for Gen McNair, 16 Sep 42, sub: Inspection of Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs, Second and Third Armies. 322/11 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(C).

33. Memo of Gen Hyssong for Gen McNair, 13 Apr 43, sub: Inspection of Adm and Repl Matters. 353.02/142 (AGF).

34. Memo cited in note 32 above.

35. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 15 Oct 42, sub: Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs Army and Corps. 322/4 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(S).

36. Statement made in confidence to AGF Hist Off, Jan 44.

37. Interviews by AGF Hist Off of heads of AGF special staff sec, Jan 44. This source will be cited hereinafter as "Interviews of special staff heads, Jan 44." The following AGF officers were interviewed on the dates indicated:

Maj (later Lt Col) F. P. Bonney (for Chem Off),
 1 Feb 44
 Col J. B. Hughes, Engr Off, 29 Jan 44
 Lt Col G. J. Collins (for Med Off), 28 Jan 44
 Lt Col (later Col) A. P. Thom (for Med Off),
 29 Jan 44
 Lt Col (later Col) E. J. Gibson (for Ord Off),
 27 Jan 44
 Lt Col (later Col) L. H. Harrison (for Ord Off),
 28 Jan 44
 Maj R. E. Peters (for Ord Off), 28 Jan 44
 Col (later Brig Gen) J. W. Younger, QM Off, 25 Jan 44
 (Note: Lt Col (later Col) H. H. Rodecker and
 Maj C. A. Brown, QM Sec, sat in on the
 interview and contributed statements
 occasionally)
 Col (later Brig Gen) Garland C. Black, Sig Off,
 26 Jan 44.

38. See below, p 106.
39. See below, pp 116, 154
40. Statement of Col J. W. Younger, QM Gd, to AGF Hist Off, 25 Jan 44.
44. Col Younger was QM of Second Army from Jan 42 to Dec 43.
41. (1) Ibid. (2) Memo (C) of Col Hyssong, AG for Gen McNair, 16 Sep 42, sub: Inspection of Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs, Second and Third Armies. 322/11 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(C).
42. Same reference as in note 41 (2) above.
43. Personal ltr of Gen McNair to Gen Lear, 9 Feb 43. Personal files of Gen Lear.
44. Statement of Col J. B. Sherman, AGF Plans Sec to AGF Hist Off, 8 Jan 44.
45. (1) Memo (C) of Gen Lear for Gen Marshall, 1 Jun 43, sub: Inspection of 1st Det Hq Sp Trs Third Army; 74th FA Brig, Cp Shelby, Miss. 333.1/66 (Inspections, Fld Forces)(C). (2) Memo of Brig Gen Philip E. Brown, Dep of TIG USA to CG AGF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Special Survey of AGF Serv Units Other Than Div. 333.1/1415 (Inspections, Fld Forces).
46. (1) Memo (C) of Gen Lear for Gen Marshall, 1 Jun 43, sub: Inspection of 1st Det Sp Trs Third Army; 74th FA Brig, Cp Shelby, Miss. 333.1/66 (Inspections, Fld Forces)(C). (2) On 30 Apr 43, the CO 5th Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs Third Army was promoted to Brig Gen, and on 15 Sep the CO 9th Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs Third Army was promoted to Brig Gen. See

History of AGF, Study No 17, History of the Third Army, p 140.

47. See below, pp 117 - 118.

48. Memo (S) of G-3 WD for CofS USA, 30 Dec 42, sub: Tng Serv Units. 353/163 (S).

49. Ibid.

50. Apportionment was by type rather than by specific units. For example, of nine quartermaster truck regiments scheduled for activation in 1943, five were to be activated and trained by AGF and four by SOS; AGF was to train all QM gas supply companies and SOS (ASF) was to train all QM laundry companies. Ibid.

51. For details of the plan for flexible grouping of battalions and companies, see History of AGF, Study No 8, Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat, pp 125-129.

52. Interviews of sp staff chiefs, Jan 44.

53. Statement of Lt Col Alfred P. Thom to AGF Hist Off, 29 Jan 44.

54. AGF ltr to CGs, 24 Jan 44, sub: Administrative Functioning of T/O Orgns. 320.2/7005.

55. Compilation "AGF." AGF G-3 Mob Div files.

56. Ibid.

57. History of AGF, Study No 8, Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat, p 128.

58. (1) Ibid. (2) Compilation "AGF Units." AGF G-3 Mob Div files.

59. (1) Interviews with sp staff heads, Jan 44. (2) History of AGF, Study No 8, Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat, p 127.

60. (1) AGF memo, Ord to G-3, 14 Jan 43, sub: Concentration of Units for Tng. 353/2129. (2) M/S of Gen McNair for G-3 AGF, 8 Jan 43, sub: Concentration of Units for Tng. 353/2129.

61. (1) Third Army ltr AG 320.2 (Gen) GNMCG-2 to CG AGF, 14 Sep 42, sub: Concentration of Serv Units by Branches. 322.11/253 (Third Army). (2) Second Army ltr AG 370.5-405 (GNMBF) to CG AGF, 31 Dec 42, sub: Transfer of Chemical Units. 353/2129.

62. Third Army ltr AG 320.2 (Gen) GNMCD-2 to CG AGF, 14 Sep 42, and AGF ltr ind thereto, 30 Sep 42, sub: Concentration of Serv Units by

Branches. 322.11/253 (Third Army).

63. Third Army ltr AG 370.5 Engrs - GNMCR to CG AGF, 19 Nov 42, and AGF 1st ind, 10 Dec 42, sub: Concentration of Serv Units by Branches. 370.5/407 (Engrs).

64. AGF M/Ss, Engr and G-4 for CofS, 2 Dec 42 and 4 Dec 42 respectively, sub: Concentration of Serv Units by Branches. Ibid.

65. Second Army ltr AG 370.5-405 (GNMBF) to CG AGF, 31 Dec 42, sub: Transfer of Cml Units. 353/2129.

66. See M/Ss by heads of the various staff secs during Jan 43. Ibid.

67. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF M/S (S), G-1 to Plans, 16 Dec 42, sub: Activation of Nondiv Units. 320.2/283 (S). (3) AGF M/S, Engr and G-4 to CofS, 2 Dec 42 respectively, sub: Concentration of Serv Units by Branches. 370.5/407 (Engrs). (4) Statement of Col J. W. Younger, AGF QM, to AGF Hist Off, 25 Jan 44.

68. (1) M/S of Gen McNair to CofS AGF, 8 Oct 42, sub: Concentration of Units for Tng. 353/2129. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 31 Jan 43, sub: Concentration of Units for Tng. Ibid.

69. Memo of Col John C. Oakes for G-3 AGF, 1 Jun 43, sub: Visit to Maneuvers and to Cp Hood, Tex, May 27-30, 1943. G-3 Tng files 333.1 (93rd Div).

70. AGF M/S (S), G-1 to Plans, 16 Dec 42, sub: Activation of Nondiv Units. 320.2/283 (S).

71. (1) AGF M/S, Gen McNair to CofS, 8 Oct 42, sub: Concentration of Units for Tng. 353/2129. (2) AGF M/S, Gen McNair to G-3, 8 Jan 43, sub: Concentration of Units for Tng. Ibid.

72. (1) Same reference as in note 71 (2) above. (2) AGF M/S (S), Gen McNair to CofS, 28 Dec 42, sub as above. 320.2/283 (S).

73. Statement of Lt Col E. J. Gibson, Ord AGF to AGF Hist Off, 27 Jan 44.

74. History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions, pp 2 - 5.

75. WD memo (S) WDGCT 320.2 Gen (8-3-42) to CG AGF, 7 Aug 42, sub: Pers and Tng Status of Units in the AGF. 320.2/283 (S).

76. Memo (S) of CG AGF for CofS USA, 9 Sep 42, sub as above. Ibid.

77. AGF M/S (S) G-3 to CofS, 2 Sep 42, sub as above. Ibid.
78. AGF memo (S) of G-4 for all Staff Secs, 20 Nov 42 and replies thereto, sub: Activation Plan for Nondiv Units. Ibid.
79. AGF M/S (S), G-1 to Plans, 16 Dec 42, sub as above. Ibid.
80. AGF M/S (S), Plans to DCofS, 19 Dec 42, sub as above. Ibid.
81. AGF M/S (S), G-3 to Plans, 4 Dec 42, sub as above. Ibid.
82. AGF M/S (S), Plans to DCofS, 19 Dec 42, sub as above. Ibid.
83. AGF M/S (S), Gen McNair to CofS, 28 Dec 42, sub as above. Ibid.
84. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 18 Mar 43, sub: Plan for Activation of Nondiv Units. 320.2/192 (R).
85. Ibid.
86. Statement of Lt Col W. W. Johnson, AGF G-3 Activation and Cadre Br, Mob Div to AGF Hist Off, 29 Jan 44.
87. AGF ltr to CGs, 19 Oct 42, sub: Tng Dir Effective November 1, 1942. 353/52 (Tng Dir).
- 88 Interviews sp staff heads, Jan 1944. 314.7 (AGF Hist).
89. Ibid.
90. (1) AGF memo, G-3 for CofS, 23 Jan 43, sub: Tng Program for Serv Units. 461/43 (MTP). (2) AGF M/S, G-4 to CofS, 5 Feb 43, sub: Tng Program for Serv Units. Originally consulted in AGF G-3 353/43 (Tng, Gen); missing in records at date of final revision.
91. Interviews of sp staff heads, Jan 44.
92. Ibid.
93. (1) AGF M/S, G-3 to Gen McNair, 15 Jan 43, sub: FA UTP. 353/252 (FA). (2) Ltr Gen McNair to CG R&SC, 16 Jan 43, sub: FA Tng Program. 353/252 (FA).
94. History of AGF, Study No 26, The Antiaircraft Command and Center, pp 31-35.
95. (1) Interviews of AGF Hist Off with Special Staff heads and members of AGF G-3 Sec, Jan 44. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 7 Jun 43, sub: Supplement to Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. 353/52 (Tng Dir).

96. AGF ltr (C) to CG TDC, 12 Nov 42, sub: Reduction of Pers and Vehicles. 320.2/340 (C). Similar letters were written to the other commands concerned.

97. Ibid.

98. History of AGF, Study No 8, Reorganization of Ground Troops for Combat, pp 47-50.

99. "Ground Rules," incl to AGF ltr (C) to CG TDC, 12 Nov 42, sub: Reduction of Pers and Vehicles. 320.2/340 (C).

100. Statement made in confidence to AGF Hist Off by AGF Sp Staff member, Jan 44.

101. (1) Statement of AGF Sig Off to AGF Hist Off, 26 Jan 44. (2) See for example AGF Bd AF Hq - NATO ltr (S) to CG AGF, 25 Jan 44, sub; Rpt No 114 AGF Bd AF HQ - NATO. 319.1 (NATO)(S).

102. (1) AGF ltr to CGs, 29 Aug 43, sub: Revision of FA and TD Tests. 353/52 (Tng Dir). (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 16 Aug 43, sub: Tng Dir Effective 1 Nov 42. Ibid.

103. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 26 Aug 43, sub: Combat Intel Tng Tests. 350.09/1 (R).

104. AGF ltr to CGs, 20 Jan 44, sub: Tng of Nondiv Combat and Serv Units. 353.01/102.

105. (1) AGF M/S, CG to G-1, 10 Jan 44, sub: Request for Add T/O Adm Pers for AA Gp. 320.2/7005. (2) Penciled notes (undated) of CofS on AGF ltr (R) (draft) to CGs, 20 Mar 45, sub: Asgmt and Atchmt of AGF Units. 321/78 (R).

106. AGF ltr to CGs, 24 Jan 44, sub: Adm Functioning of T/O Orgns, and accompanying papers. 320.2/7005.

107. Statement of Lt Col R. T. Jones, AGF Rqmt Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 May 45.

108. WD memo (S) of G-3 for CGs, AGF and ASF, 9 Aug 44, sub: Inclusion of Adm and Sup Functions in Brig and Gp Hq. AGF Rqmts file 320.3/A (S).

109. Ibid.

110. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 13 Sep 44, sub as above. Ibid.

111. WD memo (S) G-3 for CG AGF, 14 Sep 44, sub as above. Ibid.

112. Statement of following offs of AGF Rqmts Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 May 45: Lt Col E. V. Hungerford, Maj N. R. Richardson, Lt Col E. B. Hall, Maj M. T. Edmonds, Maj I. F. Belser, and Lt Col R. T. Jones.

113. AGF memo (S) for CofS USA, 13 Sep 44, sub: Inclusion of Adm and Sup Functions in Brig and Gp Hq, and accompanying papers. AGF Rqmts file 320.3/A (S).

114. AGF Obsrs SWPA Rpt (S) B-211, 11 Feb 45, sub: FA in the Leyte Campaign, 20 Oct-31 Dec 44. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

115. Maj Gen J. A. Crane, "What Makes our Army," Military Review, XXIV, Sep 44, pp 3-7.

116. Personal ltr Maj Gen J. A. Crane to Gen McNair, 22 May 44. McNair Correspondence.

117. Personal ltr Gen McNair to Maj Gen J. A. Crane, 29 May 44. Ibid.

118. Statement of Col A. L. Harding, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 May 45.

119. (1) Cir 439 WD, 14 Nov 44. Italics author's. (2) M/R attached to WD memo WDGCT 320.3 (31 Oct 44) for TAG, 31 Oct 44, sub: Change to WD Cir 256, 1943. AGO Records, 322 (12 Oct 43) Case 2. Italics author's.

120. (1) AGF ltr (R) to comdrs concerned, 20 Mar 45, sub: Asgmt and Atchmt of AGF Units, and accompanying papers. 321/78 (R). (2) Statement of Col A. L. Harding to AGF Hist Off, 10 May 45.

121. Ibid.

122. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 13 Jul 44, sub: Functioning of Med, Ord, and QM Gp Hq Dets. 320.2/334 (R).

123. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 20 Mar 45, sub: Asgmt and Atchmt of AGF Units. 321/78 (R).

124. Compiled from 320.2 (Comp Str)(C).

125. AGF M/S, CofS to CG, 11 Feb 44 (and accompanying papers), sub: POM Functions. 370.5/4202.

126. Memo of Col S. E. Rall for G-4 AGF, 11 Jul 44, sub: Rpt of Visit to 104th Inf Div and Other AGF Units, Gp Carson, Colo, AGF G-3 files 333.1/40 (Inspections by AGF Staff Offs).

127. (1) AGF M/S (R), G-3 to CofS, 13 Mar 45, sub: Asgmt and Atchmt of AGF units. 321/78 (R). (2) AGF memo, G-1 to G-3, 1 May 44, sub: Rpt of G-1 Representative on Gen McNair's Inspection Trip, 23-29 Apr 44. 353.02/599 (AGF).

128. AGF M/S (R), C&RD to G-1, 11 Feb 44, sub: Almt of Classification Off in Hq & Hq Dets Sp Trs. 322/103 (Hq and Hq Dets Sp Trs)(R).

129. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 24 Mar 44, sub: Reorgn of Hq & Hq Dets Sp Trs, Army and Sep Corps. Ibid.

130. AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 6 Jul 44, sub: Reorgn of Hq & Hq Dets Sp Trs, Army and Corps. 322/106 (Hq and Hq Dets Sp Trs)(R).

131. (1) WD ltr (R) AG 322 (29 Jul 44)OB-I-GNCCT-M to CG III Corps, 1 Aug 44, sub: Reorgn and Redesignation of the Hq & Hq Det Sp Trs III Corps. 322/1 (Hq and Hq Dets Sp Trs AGF)(R). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, III Corps, 1st Armd Div, and 1st Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs AGF, 12 Aug 44, sub: Release and Reasgmt of III Corps Units. 321/48 (R). (3) Statement of Maj W. W. Wells, AGF G-1 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 10 May 45.

132. Statement of Maj C. C. Clark, AGF G-3 Sec to AGF Hist Off, 9 Apr 45.

133. (1) Statement of Maj C. C. Clark to AGF Hist Off, 9 Apr 45. (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 7 Oct 44, sub: Almt of Pers for Hq & Hq Dets Sp Trs, Army and Sep Corps. Personnel for the Headquarters and Headquarters Detachments were placed in a bulk allotment by this letter. 322/110 (Hq and Hq Dets Sp Trs)(R). (3) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 29 Oct 44, sub: Revised Almt of Pers for Certain Hq & Hq Dets Sp Trs. 322/111 (Hq and Hq Det Sp Trs)(R).

134. AGF M/S (R) G-3 to DCofS, 13 Mar 45, sub: Asgmt and Atchmt of AGF Units. 321/78 (R).

135. AGF M/S (R) G-3 to CofS, 19 Dec 44, sub as above. Ibid.

136. This statement is based on interviews of various officers of Hq AGF by the AGF Historical Officer, 1943 - 1945, and on a survey of inspection reports of AGF officers filed in 353.02 (AGF)(Visits of AGF Staff Offs).

137. History of AGF, Study No 3, Ground Forces in the War Army: A Statistical Table; No 4, Mobilization of the Ground Army; and No 8, Reorganization of Ground Forces for Combat, contain pertinent data on this topic. Also and especially No 9, Organization and Training of New Mechanized Forces.

138. History of AGF, Study No 3, Ground Forces in the War Army: A Statistical Table.

139. Ibid.

140. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes, AGF Engr Off to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

141. History of AGF, Study No 3, Ground Forces in the War Army: A Statistical Table.

142. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

143. WD Troop Basis, 15 Jan 44, 1 Jul 44, and 1 Jan 45.

144. Ibid.

145. Ibid.

146. Information compiled for AGF Hist Off by AGF Stat Sec, 15 May 45.

147. Ibid.

148. These statements are based on a survey of the "321" and "401.1" files in the AGF AG Records and on interviews of various officers in AGF special staff sections in April - May 1945. The latter source will be cited hereinafter as "Interviews of AGF Staff Officers." The officers interviewed and the dates of interviews are as follows:

Lt Col G. J. Collins	Med Sec	3 Apr 45
Maj (later Lt Col) L. R. Watson	Engr Sec	3 Apr 45
Col J. B. Hughes	Engr Off	28 Apr 45
Col O. K. Sadtler	Sig Off	1 May 45
Col N. C. Snyder	Ex Off, Sig Sec	1 May 45
Maj (later Lt Col) G. T. Petersen	Ord Sec	2-4 May 45
W/O A. L. Creno	Ord Sec	2-4 May 45
Brig Gen H. Edward	QM Off	3 May 45
Maj G. R. Hill	QM Sec	3 May 45

149. (1) Interviews of AGF Staff Offs. (2) Memo of Col Hans W. Holmer for AGF Engr, 16 Aug 44, sub: Inspection of Units at Cp Maxey, Tex, and Cp Howze, Tex, 8-14 Aug 44. 353.02/615 (AGF). (3) Memo of Maj Clovis A. Brown, QM Sec AGF, for C-4 AGF, 27 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Visit to QM Nondiv Units Located at Cp Polk, La and Cp Livingston, La, 13-18 Nov 44. 353.02/717 (AGF).

150. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

151. Statement of Maj (later Lt Col) G. T. Petersen, AGF Ord Sec to AGF Hist Off, 2 May 45.

152. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes, AGF Engr Off to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

153. AGF Obsrs MTO Rpt (S) A-323, 5 Mar 45, sub: Comments on Questions Pertaining to TDs. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

154. AGF Obsrs SWPA Rpt (C) B-236, 28 Mar 45, sub: Employment of AAA Guns as Reinforcing FA. Ibid.

155. (1) AGF ltr to CGs, 15 Apr 44, sub: Employment of AAA Guns (Mbl) and (Sem) in Secondary Roles. 353/610 (CA). (2) Memo of Lt Col (later Col) V. B. Barnes for G-3 AGF, 30 Jun 44, sub: Rpt of Obsns Made on Visit to Memphis, Tenn, Ft Riley, Kans, Cp Campbell, Ky, 13-17 Jun 44. 353.02/570 (AGF).

156. AGF ltr to CGs, 16 Apr 44, sub: Tng Dir for Sep Inf Regts. 353.01/112.

157. AGF ltr to CG Second Army, 3 Jun 44, sub: Visit to Cp Chafee, Ark, 16-17 May 44. 353.02/554 (AGF).

158. Record of telephone conversation between Lt Col F. K. Mearnes, Fourth Army and Col V. B. Barnes, AGF, 31 Oct 44. G-3 file 000/890 (Telephone Conversations).

159. (1) AGF M/S, CofS to G-3, 27 Jan 45, sub: WD G-3 Comments on Our Tng at IARTCs. 353/216 (Inf). (2) AGF M/S (C), G-3 to CofS, 17 Jan 45, sub: Regtl Comdrs, Sep Inf Regts. 353.02/115 (AGF)(C).

160. Regtl History, 140th Inf Regt. AGO Records.

161. AGF M/S (C), G-3 to CofS, 12 Dec 44, sub: Rocket Bns. 321/108 (FA)(C).

162. (1) Statement of Col O. K. Sadtler, AGF Sig Off to AGF Hist Off, 1 May 45. (2) AGF memo for CofS USA, 22 Dec 44, sub: Plan of Opn of Proposed Sig Rad Relay Co, T/O&E 11-137. 321/929 (Sig).

163. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

164. Ibid.

165. (1) AGF ltr to CG AA Comd, 3 Dec 43, sub: Tests for AAA, and accompanying papers. 353/52. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 30 Jan 44, sub: Tng Dirs Effective 1 Nov 42, and accompanying papers. 353.01/107 (Tng Dir).

166. AGF ltr to CGs, 1 Aug 44, sub: AGF Test for AA Gun Bns as Reinforcing FA. 353/52 (Tng Dir).

167. AGF ltr to CGs, 10 Nov 44, sub: Indirect Fire Test for Tanks and TD Units. 353.4/230.

168. The revised tests (and accompanying papers) are filed in 353.01/52 (Tng Dir).

169. (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 1 Apr 44, sub: Supervision of Tng of Sub Units. 353.204 (S). (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 27 Jul 44, sub: Tech Inspections of Serv Units. 353/2321.

170. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

171. AGF ltr to CGs, 27 Jul 44, sub: Tech Inspections of Serv Units. 353/2321.

172. (1) Ibid. (2) AGF ltr to CGs, 26 Oct 44, sub: QM Unit Tng Tests. 352/251 (QM).

173. Ibid.

174. AGF units reported "not ready" by TIG, Jan 44 - Mar 45, inclusive, by quarters, were:

<u>1944</u>						<u>1945</u>			
<u>1st Quarter</u>		<u>2d Quarter</u>		<u>3d Quarter</u>		<u>4th Quarter</u>		<u>1st Quarter</u>	
<u>Units</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Units</u>	<u>%</u>
43	13	22	11	21	9	27	11	13	7.8

See: (1) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 21 Jan 45, sub: Readiness of Units for Movement Overseas. 352/1257 (Read)(R). (2) AGF ltr (R) to CGs, 24 Apr 45, sub as above. 353/1447 (Read)(R).

175. AGF ltr to CGs, 14 Jul 44, sub: Accelerated Tng of Nondiv Units. With enclosed chart. 353.01/124.

176. Ibid.

177. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

178. WD memo WDGCT 353 (6 Jan 44) to CGs AAF, AGF, ASF, 6 Jan 44, sub: Responsibility for Tng of Serv Units. 353/2301.

179. This statement is based on study of the 1944 Troop Basis and various revisions thereof. 320.2 (Tr Basis)(S).

180. See above, pp 79-80.

181. (1) ASF memo SPSHP 353 Gen, CSigO ASF for CG ASF, 18 Jan 45, sub: Integration of Photographic Tng with WD Pictorial Rqmts. 353/304 (Sig). (2) AGF ltr to CG ASF, 26 Feb 44, sub: Tng of Sig Photographic Cos. Ibid.

182. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

183. Ibid.

184. Statement of Col (later Brig Gen) H. Edward, QM AGF to AGF Hist Off, 3 May 45.

185. (1) Statement of Col O. K. Sadtler, Sig Off AGF to AGF Hist Off, 1 May 45. (2) ASF 1st ind, 27 Nov 44, to memo of CSigO for CG ASF, 21 Nov 44, sub: Tng Dir for Sig Dep Coms. 353.01/150.

186. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

187. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes, Engr Off AGF to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

188. Statement of Col N. C. Snyder, Sig Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 10 Jan 45.

189. 728th Engr Dep Co memo for Engr Sup Off, ASF Dep, Memphis, Tenn, 14 Aug 44, sub: Memo, attached to AGF ltr to CG XXII Corps, 2 Sep 44, sub: Tng of Engr Dep Cos at ASF Deps. 353/216 (Engr).

190. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

191. Statement of Col O. K. Sadtler to AGF Hist Off, 1 May 45.

192. Ltr ASF Dep, Ogden, Utah to CofEngrs, USA, 22 Sep 44, sub: Asgmt of Engr Dep Cos. 353/221 (Engr).

193. Statements of QM Off AGF, 3 May 45, and Maj (later Lt Col) G. T. Petersen, Ord AGF, 2 May 45, to AGF Hist Off.

194. Statement of Maj L. R. Watson, Engr AGF to AGF Hist Off, 21 May 45.

195. Statement of QM Off, AGF to AGF Hist Off, 3 May 45.

196. Statement of Sig Off, AGF to AGF Hist Off, 1 May 45.

197. (1) Statement of Col J. B. Hughes to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

(2) AGF M/S, Engr to G-3 Tng Div, 27 May 44, sub: Tng in Parts Sup Dep Porcedure.

198. Statement of Sig Off AGF to AGF Hist Off, 1 May 45.

199. Statement of Maj G. T. Petersen, Ord Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 2 May 45.

200. AGF M/S, Sig Sec to CofS, 8 Sep 44, sub: Tng Agencies. 314.7 (AGF Hist).

201. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

202. Ibid.

203. (1) "Comparative Strength of AGF." 320.2 (Comp Str)(S). Figures for 31 December 1942 are distinctive in that they include authorized overstrength (5% or 15%). (2) Comparative strength compilations in files of AGF Stat Sec.

204. Interviews of sp staff heads, Jan 44.

205. AGF memo (C) to CofS USA, 9 Nov 42, sub: Repl Deps. 320.2 /222 (C).

206. (1) Second Army ltr to CG AGF, 30 Jul 42, sub: A Study Showing the Delay in Achieving Combat Proficiency Due to Receiving Filler Repls in Small Increments. 341/8 (Second Army).

207. Memo (C) of Gen McNair for Gen Marshall, 2 Feb 43, sub: Discipline of Trs in North Africa. 353/1 (MTO)(C).

208. History of AGF, Study No 29, The Tank Destroyer History, Chap XI, p 5.

209. Statement of Col J. B. Hurhes, AGF Engr to AGF Hist Off, 29 Jan 44.

210. See History of AGF, Study No 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers.

211. (1) "Comparative Strength of AGF." 320.2 (Comp Str)(S). (2) Comparative Strength compilations in files of AGF Stat Sec.

212. Eleventh ind (C) by Brig Gen Russell G. Barkalow to notice of Reclassification Proceedings (undated, but Feb 44). 322.98/96 (Comdrs)(S).

213. See History of AGF, Study No 6, The Procurement and Branch Distribution of Officers.

214. Memo (C) of Gen McNair for Gen Marshall, 2 Feb 43, sub: Discipline on Trs in North Africa. 353/1 (MTO)(C).

215. Interviews of AGF Hist Off with AGF offs Lt Col L. H. Harrison, Ord Sec, 27 Jan 44, Maj R. E. Peters, Ord Sec, 28 Jan 44, and Col G. C. Black, Sig Off, 28 Jan 44.

216. Interviews of AGF Hist Off with Lt Col L. H. Harrison and Maj R. E. Peters, AGF Ord Sec, 27-28 Jan 44.

217. Memo (C) of Gen Marshall for Gen McNair, 1 Feb 43, sub: Discipline of Trs in North Africa. 353/1 (NTO)(C).

218. Memo (S) of Col H. J. Matchett for Maj Gen M. R. White, WD, 29 Apr 43, sub: Informal Conference with the CofS. Originally consulted in WD G-3 Records "Negro File" (S); document missing in records at date of final revision.

219. Personal ltr (C) of Brig Gen (later Maj Gen) Floyd Parks, CofS AGF to Maj Gen R. H. Bull, 8 Aug 42. 333.1/32 (Inspections, Fld Forces)(C).

220. "Comparative Strength of AGF," 31 Dec 43. 320.2/104 (Comp Str)(S).

221. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes, AGF Engr to AGF Hist Off, 29 Jan 44.

222. Data furnished by Lt Col G. J. Collins, AGF Med Sec, 28 Jan 44.

223. Memo of Lt Col (later Col) Barksdale Hamlett for G-3 AGF, 23 May 44, sub: Visit to Ft Sill, Okla, Cp Bowie, Tex, Ft Sam Houston, Tex, R&SC, and Ft Bragg, N.C., 14-19 May 44. AGF G-3 file 333.1/222 (Inspections by AGF Staff Off).

224. Statement of Lt Col (later Col) L. C. Gilbert, Gd Engr Sec, to AGF Hist Off, 21 Jan 46.

225. Memo of Lt Col G. S. Witters, Engr Sec AGF for G-3 AGF, 18 Jul 44, sub: Rpt of Inspection Trip, Cp Carson, Colo, Cp McCoy, Wisc. AGF G-3 file 333.1/286 (Inspections by AGF Staff Off).

226. Statement of Maj E. S. Chapman, Med Sec AGF to AGF Hist Off, 3 Apr 45.

227. Memo (R) of Maj R. G. Hill, QM Sec AGF for G-4 AGF, 11 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Visit to Hq & Hq Det Sp Trs Fourth Army, Cp Swift, Tex, 30

Oct - 3 Nov 44. 353.02/49 (AGF)(R).

228. This statement is based on a study of AGF inspection reports filed in AGF G-3 file 333.1 (Inspections by AGF Staff Off) and AGF AG file 353.02.

229. AGF memo (C) for CofS USA, 16 May 44, sub: Overstrength of Units to Equalize Losses through Attrition. 320.2/428 (C).

230. AGF M/S, G-1 to CofS, 13 Sep 44, sub: Pers Turnover. 333.1/1621.

231. Ibid.

232. Remarks of Col J. H. Banville, Rpt of Gen Lear's Conference with AGF Units at Ft Ord, 26 Aug 44. 353.02/635 (AGF).

233. Memo of Maj Clovis A. Brown, QM Sec AGF for G-4 AGF, 27 Nov 44, sub: Rpt of Visit to QM Nondiv Units Located at Cp Polk, La, and Cp Livingston, La, 13-18 Nov 44. 353.02/717 (AGF).

234. 1st ind, 9 Jan 45, by Fourth Army to AGF ltr (C) to CG Fourth Army, 31 Dec 44, sub: Adjustment of Unit Str. 320.2/489 (C).

235. See History of AGF, Study No 21, Preparation of Units for Overseas Movement.

236. AGF M/S, Engr Sec to Sig, G-3, and G-4 Secs, 23 Oct 44, sub: Draft No 2, POM. 370.5/4227.

237. Memo of Col H. W. Holmer, AGF Engr Sec for AGF Engr, 16 Mar 44, sub: Rpt of Inspection Trip. 353.02/491 (AGF).

238. Statements of G-3s, Second and Fourth Armies at Dedepl Conferences, Hq AGF, 27-28 Mar 45.

239. Memo of Maj (later Lt Col) G. H. Murphy, G-1 AGF for CofS AGF, 10 Nov 44, sub: Inspection of Physical Profile Records and Procedures. 353.02/712 (AGF).

240. Ibid.

241. Interviews with AGF Staff Offs.

242. Ibid.

243. Memo of Lt Col V. B. Barnes for G-3 AGF, 20 Jun 44, sub: Rpt of Obsns Made on Visit to Memphis, Tenn, Ft Riley, Kans, and Cp Campbell, Ky, 13-17 Jun 44. 353.02/570 (AGF).

244. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

245. Memo of Maj (later Lt Col) Robert D. Durst, G-1 Sec AGF for G-3 AGF, 1 May 44, sub: Rpt of G-1 Representative on Gen McNair's Inspection Trip, 23-29 Apr 44. AGF G-3 file 333.1/23 (Inspections by AGF Staff Off).

246. AGF ltr to CG Fourth Army, 8 Jul 44, sub: Visit to Cp Polk, La, and Cn McCain, Miss. 353.02/583 (AGF).

247. See History of AGF, Study No 12, The Building and Training of Infantry Divisions.

248. See History of AGF, Study No 29, The Tank Destroyer History, Chap VIII, p 5.

249. AGF ltr to CGs, 14 Apr 42, sub: FA Firing. 353.1/92 (FA).

250. Interviews special staff heads, Jan 44.

251. Memo of Col John W. Middleton to AGF G-4, 17 Jun 42, sub: Rpt of Inspections: Ft Jackson, Cp Sutton, Ft Bragg, and Cp Pickett. 333.1/1164 (Insp, Fld Forces).

252. AGF M/S (S), Sig Off to CofS, 26 Jun 42, sub: Inspection of Sig Corps Units at Cp Crowder, Mo. 320.2/283 (S).

253. Memo of Brig Gen Philip E. Brown, Dep of IC, USA for CG AGF, 11 Dec 42, sub: Sp Survey of AGF Serv Units other than Div. 333.1/1415 (Insp, Fld Forces).

254. AGF ltr to CG Third Army, 31 Dec 42, sub: Visit to Cp Gruber and Cp Barkeley. 353.02/33 (AGF).

255. (1) Ltr of CG 3d ABS Tng Cp to CG Second Army, 19 Nov 42. Second Army file AG 353-173. (2) History of AGF, Study No 17, The Third Army, pp 56, 87. (3) History of AGF, Study No 22, The Amphibious Training Center.

256. Memo (S) of Gen McNair for Gen Marshall, 3 Jul 43, sub: Policies Governing Issues of Equip. 320.2/22 (TUB '43)(S).

257. (1) WD memo (S) OPD 400 WMP (3-1-43) to CG AGF, 22 Apr 43, sub: Victory Program TB. Ibid. (2) ASF memo (S) PAOG 475 to OPD, 19 Jun 43, sub: Policies Governing Issue of Equip. Ibid. (3) WD memo (S) OPD 400 (19 Jun 43) to CG AGF, 26 Jul 43, sub: Preshipment. Ibid.

258. Statement of Col J. B. Hughes, AGF Engr to AGF Hist Off, 29 Jan 44.

259. Statement of AGF Engr Off to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.

260. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

261. Interviews of AGF Staff Offs.

262. AGF M/S (S), Ord Sec to G-3, 13 Apr 45, sub: Maint Tng and Procedure. AGF Ord file "Ord Maint, 1945" (S).

263. AGF M/S, Ord to G-3, 10 Mar 45, sub: AGF Tng Memorandum No 1. AGF G-3 file 300.6 (Tng Memo No 1).

264. Statement of Engr Off, AGF to AGF Hist Off, 28 Apr 45.